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Abstract 
 
This PhD explores Bergsonian notions of duration and the unrepresentable 
characteristics of creative emotion. Contemplating emotion through Bergson’s 
duration assists an understanding of the measure of emotion’s quantitative 
multiplicity, the complexity of its qualitative multiplicity and its creative potential. 
The application of these ideas to the Deleuzian cinematic concepts of the 
movement-image and time-image, allows the exploration of digital and analogue 
cinematic techniques alongside the characteristics of representable and 
unrepresentable emotion.  
 
The analysis of emotion traverses various historical and contemporary subjects 
that include areas such as philosophy, science, art and digital sound and moving-
image technology.  
 
Three video pieces created for this thesis illustrate and elucidate the theoretical 
argument. The first work deals with movement, duration and change, the second 
with coexistent time, memory and perception and the third with intuition the élan 
vital and creative emotion. Each film is intended to allow the viewer/listener to enter 
their own creative emotion.  
 
Thus the research revaluates and elevates the further potentials of emotion, 
beyond its mere representation in order to discover how its very nature, suggests 
new approaches to the creation of art work that is itself, able to reveal the nature 
and process of creative emotion. 
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Introduction: 
Bergson, Creative Emotion, Duration and the Motion of Video and Film. 
 
My own creative work has spanned several mediums which include wood and 
stone carving, in particular the process of stone carving led to my interest in 
movement and the duration of the production of an artwork. Importantly an intuitive 
approach, which seemed to rely on an indefinable emotive force, informs my 
creation of film, video, sculpture, sound, text and performance work. My interest in 
movement and duration and the change of light over the production of creative 
work prompted my exploration of 8mm film, 16mm film, VHS video, Standard and 
High Definition Video, as well as computer animation and 3D technology1. Sound 
manipulation and the spatial movement of sound on headphones, radio broadcast 
and in situ, has also extended the remit of my creative production over duration. 
More recently my work has included time-lapse techniques, shots of extended 
length and sound and image recorded with mobile phone technology. The use of 
this technology assisted my conception and curation of Barrister/Artist B.Temple’s 
exhibition, which experimented with digital production and enlarged printout 
techniques. Sections of the theoretical research for this thesis, also directly 
influenced the theme and hang of her show Representing Refugees2.  
 
My PhD by Practice consists of three time-based artworks, which I use to explore 
Bergsonian philosophy, duration and the unrepresentable characteristics of creative 
emotion. Digital and analogue filmmaking techniques, inform my research 
methodology and the production of audiovisual work. My main questions are: What 
happens to emotion when we place it in duration? How do Bergsonian models of 
movement and duration assist an exploration of unrepresentable emotion through 
the Deleuzian cinematic concepts of the movement-image and time-image? How 
can we apply Deleuzian thought to the techniques of analogue and digital cinema 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Appendix 1 for work examples. 2	  See Appendix 2 for examples of work and catalogue for B.Temple – Representing Refugees 
Exhibition, Matrix Chambers.   
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production and our understanding of creative emotion? How can I reveal through 
the production and discussion of these techniques, the potential of emotion, to 
affect new ideas and methodologies, in moving-image and sound creation?  
 
Deleuzian concepts of the ‘movement-image’ and ‘time-image’ in cinema develop from 
‘four commentaries on Bergson’s notions of movement, image, recognition and time’ 
(Deleuze, 2002: 9). This thesis investigates the movement-image to understand the 
production of external images, and the time-image to understand how we could 
create, with perception and memory, coexistent images of time. I endeavour to explore 
what making the Deleuzian notion of coexistent past, present and future time visible 
might mean, and how this same experience of time and duration, can be portrayed in 
my practice. I also consider whether my work is capable of allowing the viewer/listener 
to enter their own creative emotion. In so doing, I explore the further potentials of 
emotion, beyond its mere representation to discover how its movement and 
continually changing nature, can suggest new approaches to the creation of 
audiovisual work. 
 
In Time and Free Will, Bergson discusses our experience of the changing nature of 
sympathy to explain how emotion moves and changes in a similar way to pure 
duration. Duration for Bergson involves two types, one where time functions as an 
automatic succession of quantitative units, these homogenous juxtaposed moments 
exist externally to the self. The other type of duration is its pure form and enables us to 
enter into the depths of ourselves; its characteristics are qualitative, heterogeneous 
and inseparable. This pure duration is the accumulated and continuously progressive 
form of time, which moves beyond digital measure and the time of ticking clocks, to 
retain through our experience of memory and emotion, new experiences in the 
present.  
 
Representable emotion helps us to express and articulate our unrepresentable 
pleasure, pain and creativity, in the material world.  Unrepresentable emotion helps us 
to intuitively create with everything that we are indefinably about and becoming. The 
unrepresentable and creative force of emotion forms the foundation of my research, 
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which I investigate in relation to my film practice and my production methodology.  
Bergsonian and Deleuzian philosophy provide the grounding for my articulation of the 
intent of my films, as well as to the importance of emotion, for artistic production and 
the creation of the new.  
 
Emotion when contemplated through Bergson’s duration can assist our 
understanding of either the measure of its quantitative multiplicity, or the complexity 
of its qualitative multiplicity and its creative potential. Self-sufficient emotions 
(creative emotions) are capable of affecting thought and generating new ideas 
(Deleuze, 2002: 110). If we apply these ideas to the Deleuzian cinematic concepts 
of the movement-image and time-image, we can explore digital and analogue 
cinematic techniques alongside the characteristics of representable and 
unrepresentable emotion.  If we accept, as Deleuze suggests, that cinema offers a 
way of analyzing the meaning of images and the functioning of thought, it follows 
that because the cinematic experience engages with the emotional response of the 
audience, it could also provide a medium through which we can explore image, 
sound, emotion and movement. 
 
Modern movement developed from Copernicus’s introduction of a heliocentric 
system, which questioned our perception of time, motion and space. Science, 
philosophy and art were compelled to revise their methodological and theoretical 
approach to our external and internal experiences of life.  Earth’s journey around 
the sun began our adventure into a profoundly different world. This undermined our 
privileged universal status and our vision of a heaven above, and a hell below.  
 
Galileo was incarcerated for supporting these ideas, although further established 
not only was the sun at the centre of the universe, but it too was in motion and 
rotation.  He sought the reasons for the causes and effects he observed in nature, 
developing laws for motion and descent by calculating the entire trajectory of falling 
bodies, with water-clocks. As Bergson elucidates, 
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Galileo thought there was no essential moment, no privileged instant. To 
study the falling body is to consider it as it matters not what moment in its 
course. The true science of gravity is that which will determine, for any 
moment of time whatever, the position of the body in space. (1998: 331) 
 
The material universe for Descartes functioned like a machine controlled by laws of 
matter in motion. He speculated on nature’s first causes and formed analytical 
geometry, to define motion with lines and curves. His laws of mechanics extended 
to the human body, which generated heat and movement (Eaton,1927:363). The 
body, brain and nervous system could be divided and measured with geometrical 
depth, breadth and length. The soul however, remained an indivisible thinking 
substance with ‘no place in the quantifiable world of physics’ (Gregory, 1988:189).  
 
For Descartes, our eyes, interpreted light reflected from external objects as 
sensations, which united into images in the brain’s pineal gland. This acted upon 
the soul by allowing it to see, which excited the passions and induced bodily 
actions such as flight or fight, as a response to desire, fear or courage. All new 
events were passions, formed by a cause and its effect and these passions split 
into those of the body that is related to external action, and those of the soul, which 
stirred deep inside the pineal gland. The soul, desperate for self-control of the 
passionate, chaotic, emotional and reactionary body, utilised mathematics, 
measurement and reason. Which is why for Descartes, it was important to 
distinguish between our passions and the potential of our inner emotions. He 
states, 
 
inward emotions touch us most nearly, and in consequence have much 
more power over us than passions from which they differ, and which are met 
in conjunction with them, it is certain that, provided our soul is always 
possessed of something to content itself with inwardly, none of the troubles 
that come from elsewhere have any power to harm it, but rather serve to 
increase its joy, inasmuch as, seeing that it cannot be harmed by them, it is 
made sensible of its perfection. (cited in R.M. Eaton, 1927:394-395) 
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Here we glimpse the power of inner emotion, for philosophy, and its potential to 
generate joy and satisfy the soul. Instead of simply being a part of observable 
bodily action, and our emotional reactions to representable sensations in space. 
We find an immeasurable, unrepresentable synthesis of evolving and complex 
emotion.  
 
All motion, for Descartes, was relative to other objects in motion without fixed 
references in space. He implied a theory of relativity where nothing was at rest 
(Homer.W.Smith, 1959: 113). He was however, swayed by scientific fact and 
summarised his physical principles as, ‘give me matter and motion and I will make 
a world’. (R. M. Eaton, 1927:vi) For Descartes,  
 
the heavens are a machine, vast swirling vortices of particles separated out 
from an original undifferentiated matter; the human brain and body are 
machines, delicately adjusted to the flow of the blood in the animal spirits, 
like the fountains of a French formal garden. (cited in R. M. Eaton, 1927: vi) 
 
Newton formed universal laws of celestial mechanics that enabled modern science 
to measure time and movement. For Newton, time, space and movement were 
mathematically divisible and measurable, by the placement and addition of objects 
in space. His theories of gravitation established universal constants of absolute 
time and rest, to which the position of all events could be referred (Fraser, 
1990:114).  Any event could be located, at any instant in space and time, and by 
adding the successive moments of an event together, summed up into a totalising 
whole.  Modern philosophy constructed similar totalities by adding successive units 
of conscious events together. Consciousness was as measurable as the 
scientifically observable universe. The consequence as Bergson explains, is 
unrepresentable internal states are confused with external symbols and objects in 
space. This stills our inner potential for movement, change and the creation of the 
new.  
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Unlike Newton, Kant considered space and time not as absolutes but as ‘a priori’ 
forms required for reasoning and knowledge. Although accredited for unhinging 
time from its subordination to the measure of movement in space, Bergson shows, 
Kant confused time with space, stilling our potential to change and create the new.  
Kant proposed space and time were not conditions for the existence of things. 
Instead, both offered the possibility for the manifestation and synthesis of external 
and internal things, within our knowledge and understanding, Space, time and 
mathematics were a priori subjective forms of human sensibility, which were given 
by the manifold of sense to the mind. For Kant, sensations existed in space, and 
space and sensations could be measured by geometric configuration. The mind 
and consciousness on the other hand, existed in time, which could be accounted 
for by the repetition and addition of mathematical units. Space and geometry 
enabled our combination of co-existent sensations, while time and arithmetic 
facilitated our account of their succession in thought. 
 
Spatial sensations such as colour, fragrance, taste and sound were received in 
temporal succession and intellectually processed into concepts of substance and 
cause.  This implemented a change within us, from how we felt about received 
sensations, to how we thought about them (Erdmann, 1924: 378-379). Our 
subjective sensations became unified by the mind through the addition of their 
moments in time. Conscious concepts were formed by unifying passively received 
external sensations, into a time-succession, which combined to form our 
knowledge. Judgments of experience arose out of sense perception, which thought 
spontaneously united into a conscious event (Erdmann, 1924: 378-379). 
Accordingly, time was made from homogenous juxtaposed moments, so 
successive sensations could be counted one after the other to form a synthesis in 
consciousness. Thus, time and consciousness functioned like the repetition of 
mathematical units in space. As Bergson states,  
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If time, as the reflective consciousness represents it, is a medium in which 
our conscious states form a discrete series so as to admit of being counted, 
and if on the other hand our conception of number ends in spreading out in 
space everything which can be directly counted, it is to be presumed that 
time, understood in the sense of a medium in which we make distinctions 
and count, is nothing but space. (2001:91)  
 
In other words Kant’s mathematical principles confused time with space, mixing our 
Ego and internal states with symbolically representational matter in space. He 
‘ascribed to the causal relation the same meaning and the same function in the 
inner as in the outer world’ (Bergson, 2001:232). As a consequence, he 
disregarded our continuously changing natures. Instead, perceiving conscious and 
psychic states as if they were mechanically formed by cause and effect in space 
(Bergson, 2001:232). This results in our conscious and internal states reoccurring in 
our inner depths, as if physical phenomena repeated in space. Consequently, our 
comprehension of our inner selves was prevented from experiencing movement 
and the potential for change within duration. As Deleuze states, 'what Bergson 
shows us is that if the past is not past at the same time that it is present, not only 
will it never be able to be constituted, but it could also never thereafter be 
reconstituted starting from a later present’ (Deleuze, 2004: 29). 
 
Modern philosophy like science, had constructed a totalizing concept of time. 
Everything new could be reinterpreted as something that already existed in nature, 
although had escaped previous discovery. This stifled the possibility of open and 
new creation, and our potential to continually progress. For Bergson, time is an 
invention that mathematically reduces everything to a calculated and representable 
whole. To counteract the problem of measurable ready-made time and space, and 
Kant’s confusion of their characteristics, Bergson defines duration. His exploration 
of duration begins by identifying two types of multiplicity, one being quantitative and 
the other qualitative.  
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Quantitative multiplicity refers to representable material objects that can be 
individually measured and counted in space. Homogenous forms include 
mathematical symbols, human bodies, MRI brain areas, cars, stilled film frames 
etc. Individually, each representable thing could be counted and spatially 
juxtaposed. To assist our understanding of quantitative multiplicity, Bergson 
provides an analogy of a flock of sheep. If we ignore their individual differences, we 
could simply observe their common homogenous appearance and characteristics 
as sheep. Each sheep could then be spatially juxtaposed and represented as a 
symbolic number in space.  
 
If we retain this image of flock of sheep, assuming all are identical but occupy 
different positions in space, we can imagine their simultaneous existence within the 
same image. We could also imagine a single sheep repeated fifty times, 
constituting a series of images of a single sheep added together by the mind in 
time, instead of in space.  However, a repeated unit (or image of a sheep) over 
time in our conscious imagination requires symbolic representation. To picture 
repeated images of the same sheep in our imagination, both separately and in 
succession, requires more than an image of a single sheep. That is to say, Kant’s 
repetition of the unit in time cannot ‘form an image or idea of number without the 
accompanying intuition of space’ (Bergson, 2001: 78). This makes it almost 
impossible to account for a priori knowledge, without forming symbolic 
representations. As Bergson points out, 
 
as soon as we fix our attention on the particular features of objects or 
individuals, we can of course make an enumeration of them, but not a total, 
the idea of number implies the simple intuition of a multiplicity of parts or 
units, which are absolutely alike. (2001: 76) 
 
Applying this concept of multiplicity, as we go deeper into consciousness, we find a 
multiplicity of complex states. If we add their moments together, their number 
would be identical to the number of moments we take to count them. However, in 
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order to do this we would need to still them into co-ordinates or numerically 
representable symbols in space. The consequence is we juxtapose conscious and 
psychic states and so the same states reoccur, in a similar way to physical 
phenomena repeated in space. Consciousness however, requires change over 
duration so we are continuously becoming.  
 
If we applied the same idea to counting the pixels of a stilled digital film frame, we 
would be able to individually count each spatially juxtaposed pixel and define the 
total number of pixels in the image, say to a number of 500.  Or we could imagine 
one single pixel and repeat its image, adding each imagined repeated pixel image 
together until reaching a number of 500 pixels. However, if we imagine one pixel 
repeated 500 times, we end up with a similar analogy to Kant’s repetition of the unit 
in time, whereby a repeated pixel constitutes a succession of single units. When in 
fact, what we are observing, is the qualitative becoming of unbroken speeding light.  
 
Qualitative multiplicity is true duration and can be applied to our inner experiences 
and conscious states which only become quantitative multiplicities, if symbolically 
represented in space for analysis (Bergson, 2001: 85-86). Whether applied to the 
motion of inner emotion and consciousness, (or cinemas flow of projected light) we 
are often too busy analyzing representation in space (the observable action of 
cinema or gesture of emotion) to grasp their changing characteristics over duration.  
 
To illustrate unmeasured qualitative and heterogeneous multiplicity Bergson 
discusses the complexity of sympathy. The essence of sympathy is a feeling of 
‘qualitative progress’, which develops from our pity for others as a ‘transition from 
repugnancy to fear, from fear to sympathy, and from sympathy itself to humility’ 
(Bergson, 2001: 18-19). The nature of internal emotion and conscious states are, 
as Bergson shows, are inexpressible because they are continuously changing 
qualitative multiplicities. 
 
When we experience ourselves outside laws of causality by placing ourselves 
within our own duration we encounter characteristics that are qualitative, 
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heterogeneous and inseparable. Pure duration is the accumulated and 
continuously progressive form of time.  
 
Below homogeneous duration, which is extensive symbol of true duration, a 
close psychological analysis distinguishes a duration whose heterogeneous 
moments permeate one another; below the numerical multiplicity of 
conscious states, a qualitative multiplicity; below the self with well-defined 
states, a self in which succeeding each other means melting into one 
another and forming an organic whole. (Bergson, 2001: 128) 
 
Qualitative duration is continuous, differentiating and its motion indivisible 
(Bergson, 1992:164-165). This process of indivisible motion is fundamental to the 
production of my creative film work, which relies on continuous motion and images 
becoming. Bergson prioritizes movement over the image of the material thing that 
moves, because the moving object detracts us from the purity of its motion. 
Movement is in duration, continuous, differentiating, heterogeneous, indivisible and 
important for our experience of continuing change. Duration is neither linear nor 
chronological; instead each instant is a continual opening onto an indefinable 
future. 
 
Consciousness for Bergson, like duration, requires continuing movement and 
change that is neither chronologically linear nor measurable. Instead, 
consciousness and duration are continually new within an open future. Pure 
duration is continuously progressive, containing the past and providing the 
centrepiece for Bergson’s notion of memory. Memory conserves the past, while 
never experiencing the same re-cognition. In memory, each new and different 
moment is added to previous ones, as the next new moment occurs. If we refer to 
memory’s moments as images, each image would be added to a previous image, 
as a new image arrives.  
 
Images of conscious thought, as Bergson points out, are due to light illuminating 
matter. Matter and our observation of it, are images and so become one and the 
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same thing. If the interaction of light with objects is seen to provide our image of 
consciousness, and as Einstein proved light is in a state of constant motion and 
change, then likewise, our images of consciousness must function within a 
constant state of unrest, motion and change. Einstein challenged Newton’s space 
and time as absolute independent frames of reference.  When space and time are 
independent of each other, they are unable to account for changing velocities of 
light, which means they must be a composite entity. The four dimensions in which 
all events occur are called space–time continuum because the unique time of an 
event requires reference to the specific place it occurs.   
 
For Bergson, every observed particle and object located in space and time, is a 
bloc of space-time that reveals unfixed figures of light, instead of the rigid lines of 
material objects. Our image of movement arises on a plane of immanence where 
unfixed light illuminates matter that forms our images. These movement-images 
display more than mere cause and effect because each instant is continually open 
onto an indefinite future. Light transmission occurs over an entire plane of 
immanence that extends in all directions. Whenever light is observed, it reveals a 
completely new and variable event that is in constant motion. Events for Bergson 
occur outside of a presumed and constructed whole as illuminated ‘any-instants-
whatsoever’, which form our images of consciousness as we observe the external 
universe.  As a result, our images of consciousness also occur outside of a 
constructed whole as any-instants-whatsoever. 
 
This completely converts philosophy and achieves Bergson’s aim, as Deleuze 
succinctly puts it ‘to give modern science the metaphysics which corresponds to it’ 
(1997: 7). Time is not a string of equidistant instants, when movement relates to 
any-moment-whatever, thinking can do the same, opening up to new possibilities 
for ‘the remarkable and singular’ to occur at any moment in thought (1997: 7). As 
Bergson observed,  
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Ancient science thinks it knows its object sufficiently when it has noted of it 
some privileged moments, whereas modern science considers the object at 
any moment whatever. (1998: 330)  
 
Even Einstein admitted he was wrong not to understand that the universe was 
expanding and changing at every moment. When every new moment has the 
potential for the completely new to occur, our external images and as such our 
conscious images remain spontaneous and creative. Deleuze suggests this idea 
should also be extended to art and that ‘cinema is an essential factor in this, and 
that it has a role to play in the birth and formation of this new thought’ (1997: 7).  
  
Even though film-time is not a string of equidistant and interchangeable instants, to 
think of its time in this modern way allows new images and ideas to emerge at any 
instant. As Deleuze explains, 'at every instant, the movement is no more, but 
precisely because it is not made up of instants, because instants are only its real or 
virtual cessations, its product and the shadow of its product' (2004: 24). To illustrate 
modern scientific motion Deleuze refers to Muybridge’s photographic stills of a 
galloping horse. These equidistant snapshots relate the whole canter of the horse 
to ‘any-point-whatever’, which reveal extraordinary moments as ‘the horse has one 
foot on the ground, then three, two, one’ (Deleuze 1997: 5). Each specific frozen 
image of the horse’s movement through space can be observed as one unique 
moment in time. ‘These instants… (are) formally impossible as the addition of 
privileged poses or photographic long-exposures into movement. The horse 
provides ‘movement not as moments of actualisation of a transcendent form’, but 
as snapshots of the horse’s movement, throughout its entire gallop (Deleuze, 1997: 
6). 
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Figure1. Muybridge stills (1878) 
 
Deleuze defines film movement that fits to Bergson’s notion of any instant-what-so-
ever; cinema according to Deleuze is ‘not merely the photo, but the snapshot’ 
(1997: 5). The photographic long exposure is not a characteristic of cinema. 
Instead, cinema produces equidistant snapshots on film, which Edison and 
Dickson attached to a mechanism that moved the images. In this sense cinema 
appears to reproduce movement as a selection of snapshots, which function as 
any-instant-whatever that create an impression of continuity. Film movement 
however, surpasses motion analysis by presenting the shot as an intermediate 
image in movement. As Deleuze states, ‘the shot is the movement-image, in so far 
as it relates movement to a whole which changes, it is a mobile section of duration’ 
(1997: 22). 
 
The things we observe in film never become materially fixed objects. Film, ‘is a set 
of movement-images; a collection of lines or figures of light; a series of space-time’ 
(Deleuze, 1997:61). Cinematic movement, like all movement, is an irreducible 
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action that would lose its property as movement, if segmented into specific 
immobile sections and calculated in space. As Deleuze explains, in relation to 
moving objects and their expression, 
 
one might conceive of a series of means of translation (train, car, 
aeroplane…) and in parallel, a series of means of expression (diagram, 
photo, cinema). The camera would then appear as an exchanger or, rather, 
as a generalised equivalent of the movements of translation. (1997: 4-5) 
 
Usually movement is interpreted as objects changing position in space, however 
‘true movement’ is indivisible because the object that moves and the time and 
space it travels through all change qualitatively as a whole. Movement exists in two 
ways: 1) as either a part /object in motion or 2) it expresses itself, as movement 
which is the duration of the whole. To show how our waiting expresses ‘duration as 
mental, spiritual reality’, Bergson asks us to imagine a sugar cube dissolving in a 
glass of water (Deleuze 1997: 8-9). This reveals how movement of the content of 
the glass, as well as the whole universe that surrounds it, all change qualitatively 
as the open whole. As a result, duration is qualitative changed and becomes 
divided up in objects, which moving objects relate to the changing whole, which in 
turn movement expresses. 
 
Bergson discovers qualities are themselves pure vibrations, which change at the 
same time as the elements move. The movement of pure atoms ‘testify to a 
reciprocal action of all parts of the substance’ that expresses ‘modifications, 
disturbances, changes of energy in the whole’ (Deleuze 1997: 8-9). Real 
movement is a singular unrepeatable action that occurs in the present, separate to 
the space travelled through, which always exists in the past. Real movement is 
only possible when the whole is open, unexpected, and not given, as an eternal 
order of poses or instants in time. 
 
The wholly superficial displacements of masses and molecules studied in 
physics and chemistry becomes, by relation to that inner vital movement 
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(which is transformation and not translation) what the position of a moving 
object is to the movement of that object in space. (Deleuze 1997:9)  
 
Duration allows us to comprehend our heterogeneous multiplicity and qualitative 
potential, as well as emotion’s unrepresentable relationship to the movement and 
change of film. Real movement is a mobile section of duration and film, whether 
digital or analogue technology, remains a moving-image that endures and changes 
within the whole and over the whole of duration, each and every new time it is 
shown. The duration of the whole, as Deleuze explains, 
 
creates itself in another dimension without parts – like that which carries 
along the set of one qualitative state to another, like the pure ceaseless 
becoming which passes through these states. It is in this sense that it is 
spiritual or mental. (1997: 10)  
 
Our experience in duration is unrepresentable because as soon as we attempt to 
represent it, we find ourselves in the flux of a new present, which is ever becoming. 
Emotion has a physically representable side, as in the expression or gestures of a 
filmic character. It also has a side, which is our inner experience of complex 
changing states of emotion throughout the experience of a film. Whether the film’s 
characteristics are narrative or experimental is irrelevant, because it is simply our 
experience of film movement, which helps us to grasp movement as the 
expression of change, as well as the potential of unrepresentable emotion, as it 
progresses forwards and creates the new. Deleuze, paraphrasing Bergson, states  
 
If the living being is a whole and, therefore comparable to the whole of the 
universe, this is not because it is a microcosm as closed as the whole is 
assumed to be, but on the contrary, because it is open upon a world, and 
the world, the universe, is itself the Open. (1997:10) 
 
The above exegesis on Bergson’s concept of duration provides a methodology for 
my practice. Each video is committed to an open process of creativity and each 
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shot, is complicit with the continuously changing world that surrounds it. On the 
other hand, the capabilities of the video equipment and technology utilised, help to 
define the recording and endpoint of each filmed piece. The creation of my practical 
work is premised upon the journey of internal emotion towards its expression, through 
moving image and an open process of making. This ensures my practice remains 
congruent with the open whole, which is continuously changing. 
 
Below I provide titles with sample stills for each practical investigation and chapter of 
my PhD dissertation- with a brief list of the main theoretical research undertaken:  
 
Chapter One: In My Breath I Drew: Bergson’s Method Of Movement 
 
Figure 2. Stills from In my Breath I Drew 
 
This digital video captures the movement of an image throughout its duration of 
becoming. In post-production the video was reversed and its speed increased 
reducing its length of sixty minutes to six minutes, making our understanding of its 
change over duration more accessible. My video also highlights the subtle nuance 
and immanence of the moving-image and my experience of creative emotion 
during the moving-images making. This intuitive process is unable to predict a 
specific outcome. Importantly this challenges our understanding of a measurable 
and knowable end, in favour of a durational image that reveals continuous change 
and becoming. Here the research reflects on altered views within philosophical and 
scientific thought, which have resulted from changing perceptions of light and 
movement. These views have challenged my understanding of time, space, 
consciousness, duration, emotion and artistic creation.  
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Chapter Two:  Portrait Of Myself: Bergson’s Method of Memory and Perception   
 
Figure 3. Stills from Portrait of Myself 
 
Here a tracking shot looks back on its own image over its duration, to consider 
Bergson’s theories of memory and perception, and their potential to inform methods of 
video production. This addresses the coexistence of three forms of past, present and 
future time becoming. I also consider whether moving-image artwork is capable of 
allowing the viewer/listener to enter their own creative emotion, as they generate new 
creative ideas beyond those presented by the on-screen image and sound. I 
contemplate how the perceiver of artwork begins a journey from their own pure and 
self-sufficient emotions into the realms of their own creative durational process, thus 
painting an internal portrait of their self-becoming.  
 
Chapter Three: Method Of Orange: Bergson’s Method Of Intuition       
 
Figure 4. Still from Method of Orange 
 
The two videos created for this section show the duration of fading light at sunset. 
In post-production one video image was duplicated four times and mirrored and 
reflected – this method could only replicate the original perceived image as if 
naturally reflected and mirrored on a surface of water. Finally, two new video 
sections were created, by matching the four images/frames back together again. 
One shot moves from intuition towards intelligence, while the other falls back into 
itself. The perceiver synthesises the two tendencies of intuition and intelligence, 
through their creative emotion into their becoming. 
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Chapter One 
In My Breath I Drew: Bergson’s 
Method of Movement 
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CHAPTER 1: 
In My Breath I Drew: Bergson’s Method of Movement 
 
 
Figure 5. 
Picasso drawing Centaur (1949) 
 
The movement and change of film and video is their light, and like the movement of 
unrepresentable creative emotion, this is implicit with the duration of a process of 
creativity, the materialization of an image, and the activity of a video/filmmaker 
becoming. Picasso claimed, ‘it would be very interesting to preserve 
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photographically, not the stages, but the metamorphoses of a picture’ (cited in 
Harrison, Wood, 2004: 508). It is this idea of the change of an image over duration 
that I endeavour to capture, in my video In My Breath I Drew.  This metamorphosis 
and duration of the making of a picture, leads to my investigation of creativity with 
digital video technology, and the significance of unrepresentable emotion, to this 
process.  
 
Ravaisson’s philosophy3, as Bergson elucidates ‘springs from the idea that art is a 
figured metaphysics, that metaphysics is a reflection on art, and that it is the same 
intuition, variously applied, which makes the profound philosopher and the great 
artist' (Bergson, 1992: 231). Intuition, as Bergson explains has become 
increasingly devalued as science and philosophy favour intelligence, reason and 
analysis. Artists however, insert themselves 'within the object by a kind of sympathy 
[and] an effort of intuition’, which breaks down ‘the barrier that space puts up 
between’ the artist and the art form (Bergson, 1998: 177). 
 
This approach to philosophical enquiry informed the entirety of Bergson’s thought, 
importantly for him, philosophy should fundamentally find ways to create the novel, 
and articulate the continuously new. He advises the philosopher to follow intuition, 
and the route taken by the artist when creating the new. Bergson’s intuition reveals 
a philosophy of immanence, diversity, qualitative multiplicity, openness and 
duration, which extends beyond conscious analysis. This method of intuition relies 
on emotion and our ability to sympathise, moving beyond our subjective 
experience by extending and applying this method, to other people and things.  
 
The artist for Picasso ‘is a receptacle for emotions that come from all over the 
place…ideas and emotions will in the end be prisoners in his work. Whatever they 
do, they can’t escape from the picture. They form an integral part of it, even when 
their presence is no longer discernable’ (cited in Harrison, Wood, 2004: 509).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See M.E. Moore’s review of C.Malabou’s translation of Ravaisson’s thesis, Of Habit, for an insight 
into his philosophy http://www.academia.edu/1999334/Review_of_Felix_Ravaisson_Of_Habit 
(Accessed May 25 2013). 
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Bergson proposes two different types of emotion, first those accompanied by 
muscular sensations connected to nerves and physical conditions caused by 
sensations such as sound and light, in the external world.  Second, is underlying 
pure emotion, which remains a complex state of qualitative multiplicity that is self-
sufficient (See Bergson, 2001: 7-8). Internal emotion is not be confused with an 
emotional response to an external cause, or with sensation, sentimentality and 
sensationalism because these words rob self-sufficient emotion, of its creative 
potential. Self-sufficient emotion is capable of affecting thought, generating new 
ideas and enthusing the creation of the new.  
 
Without external cause, this creative emotion is experienced prior to representation 
as a metaphysical force becoming; it also has the potential to inspire the 
materialisation of form in space. For example, when a musician experiencing the 
emotion of joy creates a symphony, the symphony becomes the representation of 
this experience, which we engage with through our sensation of its sound, in the 
material world. To harness the potential of creative emotion, Bergson suggests, we 
consider the interval that exists between social pressure and the resistance of our 
intelligence, as expressed through the ego, where the ‘creative emotion’ is 
produced. The progression of creative emotion openly forges us towards the 
future, while moving between the two divergent human tendencies of intelligence 
and intuition. 
 
In Bergsonism (2002), Deleuze refers to Bergson’s creative emotion. Importantly 
love, not as sentimentality, desire for a specific object, nor as the judgment of the 
beauty of things, but instead love as a moving progressive creative essence, which 
is graspable and expressible by all. Even though love might be a subjective 
experience, Deleuze points out, it is not necessarily an individualistic event. 
Emotion he states, becomes creative,  
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first, because it expresses the whole of creation, then because it creates the 
work in which it is expressed: finally, because it communicates a little of this 
creativity to spectators or hearers. (2002:110- 111) 
 
Philosophers and artists have this creative emotion as a common force when 
creating the new. Philosophy’s purpose, for Deleuze, is the creation of new 
concepts and creativity provides the place where art and philosophy converge.  
This leads to his investigation of contemporary art forms, including cinema, to offer 
an important development for artistic and philosophical methodology and 
production. Significantly for Deleuze cinema can assist our understanding of the 
power of thought and ways to create new concepts.  
 
My use of digital video as a contemporary art medium moves my practice and 
theoretical research beyond Ravaisson’s and Bergson’s view of art forms. Video, 
nudges me towards the Deleuzian cinematic concepts of the movement-image and 
the time-image. These concepts assist our understanding of two types of motion 
one is in space (the movement-image) and the other in time (the time-image). In 
terms of cinema Deleuze tells us that creative images need ‘to make perceptible, to 
make visible, relationships of time which cannot be seen in the represented’ (1994, 
p. xii). Instead of cinema just showing movement and change in space with 
movement-images, Deleuze urges producers of cinema, to convey images that 
challenge our everyday understanding of chronological time. The time-image, 
offers ‘a coexistence of distinct duration’ where we experience various levels of our 
past and present, as the future becomes (Deleuze, 1994: xii). This allows us to 
recognise our potential to create the new, assisting our understanding that we are 
not just our past, but part of everything in a process of open and creative 
becoming. This opens us onto the outside of everything we previously knew.  
 
What is in the present is what the image ‘represents’ but not the image itself, 
which, in cinema as in painting, is never to be confused with what it 
represents. The image itself is the system of the relationship between 
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elements, that is, a set of relationships of time from which the variable 
present only flows. It is in this sense, I think, that Tarkovsky challenges the 
distinction between montage and shot when he defines cinema by the 
‘pressure of time’ in the shot. What is specific to the image, as soon as it is 
creative, is to make perceptible, to make visible, relationships of time which 
cannot be seen in the represented object and do not allow themselves to be 
reduced to the present. (Deleuze, 1994: xii) 
 
My video In My Breath I Drew endeavours to explore what it is to make perceptible 
relationships of time in a moving image. As well as how, the image might suggest 
the movement, duration and progression of creative emotion. Artists have long 
been associated with the science of optics; in his text Secret Knowledge (2001), 
David Hockney explores the symbiotic relationship between the development of 
optical technology and painting. He explains how this led to enhanced painting 
techniques and inventions such as the camera lucida, camera obscura and 
eventually contemporary still and motion cameras. Hockney’s research spans from 
13th Century to the present day and he suggests that during the preliminary stages 
of the composition of a painting, light, mirror and lens would have assisted the 
projection of objects onto canvas, paper or wall, in order to assist accurate 
representation and replication. Artists could focus on improving drawing, painting 
and printing techniques, while advancing artistic technology.  
 
Chamberlain points out that Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) ‘devoted a passionate 
interest to the technics of instruments (he built himself a sort of telescope for the 
observation of the moon a century before Galileo)’ (Chamberlain, 1914: 123). Da 
Vinci made detailed observations of light, sight, perspective, depth perception, 
anatomy, muscles and brain. Beneath several of Da Vinci’s calculations, 
Chamberlain reads the words ‘the sun does not move’ and ‘the earth is not in the 
centre of the sun’s orbit, nor in the centre of the universe’, and is also smaller than 
the sun (Chamberlain, 1914: 107). Although he considered the sun to be at rest,  
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Da Vinci, prior to Copernicus, believed the earth was in motion, motion was 
fundamental to his ‘ideas of the cosmos as well as its relevance to the internal 
body and the circulation of the blood’ (Chamberlain, 1914: 108). 
 
Leonardo studied and enhanced painting techniques, such as chiaroscuro while 
studying perspective and areas of shadow and light. Leornado's Sfumato painting 
techniques lit a plane of immanence, upon a darkened canvas, allowing Mona 
Lisa’s mysterious smile to emerge into light. Painting evolved into more realistic 
images, bordering on the photographic, creating objects and characters that 
shimmered into life. Light captured by mirror, lens, pigment, paintbrush and the 
touch of the painter’s hand, framed and composed the shot and the emotion of the 
scene.  
 
Newton’s anatomical studies formulated principles for human physiological optics 
with respect to lens contraction, eye convergence, head movement, and the 
apparent size of objects (Fraser, 1990: 113). Fraser suggested that Newton 
developed principles for improving spectacles, telescopes and microscopes and 
probably invented the iris diaphragm, as well as forming the theoretical aspects of 
useful aperture, magnifying power, focal length and spherical aberration. Newton 
proposed the rectilinear and instantaneous propagation of light by vibration and a 
theory whereby light functioned as a stream of particles (Homer W Smith, 1959: 
113). He invented the first spectroscope that used prisms to analyse white light and 
the colours of the rainbow. Newton’s scientific observations enhanced our 
understanding of light, colour and lens technology, which established the 
foundations for our understanding of photography and digital film technology. For 
example, colour separation in digital cameras requires a beam splitter prism that 
divides the image into red, green and blue components.  
 
Techniques of depth of field and pull focus had already found their way into image 
construction and storytelling, before the birth of the still and motion camera. The 
long shot, medium shot and close up, had already been optically projected and 
composited together onto the artist’s canvas. Forming images of realism and 
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perfection, using montage techniques to amalgamate images and enhance the 
power of the paintings narrative and symbolic message. Technically and creatively, 
these images informed the development of photography and cinema.  
 
Emotion however, in relation to cinema, has tended to be understood and 
represented homogenously in space. This helps our understanding of character 
action and reaction and drives the film’s narrative forward. However, if we only 
analyse emotion’s representation in cinema, its further potentials remain 
unexplored in relation to creativity, movement, change and duration. In Creative 
Evolution Bergson considers what the duration of the creation of a work of art is 
and its undivided continuity and creation. He states, for the artist, 
 
who creates a picture by drawing it from the depths of his soul, time is no 
longer an accessory; it is not an interval that may be lengthened or 
shortened without the content being altered. The duration of his work is part 
and parcel of his work. To contract or to dilate it would be to modify both the 
psychical evolution that fills it and the invention which is its goal. The time 
taken up by the invention, is one with the invention itself. It is the progress of 
a thought which is changing in the degree and measure that it is taking form. 
It is a vital process, something like the ripening of an idea. (Bergson, 1998, 
340) 
 
Moving-image, not simply because of its representation of content but also 
because of its continual process of change over the duration of its screening, can 
assist our understanding of emotion’s changing nature. Film and video, like music, 
require our experience of the entire duration of their becoming as a specific video 
(film or piece of music). Otherwise, we would be unable to comprehend their 
changing nature. The fundamental characteristic of sound and moving-image is 
progression, which because of their movement and change, we are able to make 
sense of as time based mediums. The similarities between the motion of film,  
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video, sound and self-sufficient emotion, is not just observable and listenable 
characteristics and signs of movement within space, but also their continual 
immanence and becoming in duration and the open whole. 
 
Initially however, as Deleuze shows, our perception of the projected cinematic image 
was confused and equated with its stilled celluloid frames. Similar to early modernist 
views of movement, moving images in film, were thought to be as mathematically 
measurable and mechanical as modernist movement and thought. As a result, film 
movement was stilled into the addition of framed moments, which falsely and 
abstractly conveyed film-time as mechanistic. When in fact cinema light and its 
movement-images, are in continuous motion and change as an image openly 
becoming.  
 
Video technology, instead of dwelling on the stilled frames of early cinema, allowed 
early video artists to more easily convey their understanding of constant change and 
its relationship to their process of creative production. Embracing this new 
technological evolution, video artists applied their understanding of light, optics, sound 
and movement, to their creation of art. Video helped to express a process of creativity, 
through its longevity and the continuous change of the image and underlying 
technology. Relating processes of change to the production and representation of time 
in the observed artwork, Nan Hoover, as Martin points out used video, installation 
and performances to investigate; 
 
 the phenomena of light, movement and space: things that can only be 
suggested in painting. Video, however, is based on processing pulses of 
light in either analogue or digital signals; the transmitted video image… 
represents an energetically vital surface that is continually changing. Unlike 
the medium of film, no single, fixed shot exists in video. A so-called frame, a 
single shot in a pictorial sequence, can only be artificially created if one 
brings the video to standstill by using functions on the playback device. 
(2006:58)  
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Video for Nan Hoover, revealed a process of creativity, its longevity and 
continuously changing image of light related the processes of change, to the 
production and observation of artwork. As Hoover explained, ‘Important here is the 
luminous character, i.e. the manifestation of light as volumes, as bodies.…light as 
an independent body’ (Sylvia Martin, 2006:58). Hoover further states, ‘right from 
the beginning I was only interested in the continuity of the path from A to B: in a 
space-time continuum. For me video was comparable to the way in which one 
looks at a painting’. (Hoover cited in, Sylvia Martin, 2006:58)  
 
Figure 6. Nan Hoover’s, Lightscape 
 
Video assists our comprehension of its moving intangible technological process and 
the light and sounds it captures and projects, which we perceive in a present always 
passing onto a future becoming.  Video and digital technology (see Appendix: 2 for 
discussion of digital technology), like light, duration and our internal states, are 
impossible to directly represent as the flux of their process unfolds before our eyes 
through changing light and technology. Digital film is mobile at the time of its 
observation providing a movement-image, which is a mobile section of temporal 
duration. We do not perceive its digitalness as individual film frames added 
together, we observe its continuously moving-image and speeding light in space. 
Here it is interesting to note Deleuze’s definition of a Cartoon, 
 
When one attempts to define the cartoon film; if it belongs fully to the 
cinema, this is because the drawing no longer constitutes a pose or a 
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complete figure, but the description of a figure which is always in the 
process of being formed or dissolving through the movement of lines and 
points taken at any-instant-whatever's of their course…It does not give us a 
figure described in a unique moment, but the continuity of the movement 
which describes the figure. (1997: 5)  
 
For Deleuze, cinema has the potential to show passive time in the on-screen 
image, as an image becoming. He refers to this cinematic concept as the ‘time-image’, 
which divides thought from any on-screen representation, enabling thought to engage 
with its own processes of movement, and experience its own change. This leaves an 
interval for thought outside of editing, action, and the narrative structure of the on-
screen movement-image. Thus, allowing change to emerge within thought. 
Emphasising time instead of action highlights how we are not thinking. This in turn 
empowers thought, and stimulates new thoughts and concepts.  Philosophy’s purpose 
for Deleuze is to create new concepts that extend beyond the knowledge we have 
already acquired. This produces a question of resistance to what we previously knew.  
Cinema (art) and philosophy are capable of portraying the thought processes involved 
in the creation of concepts, and both should provide knowledge of the powers of 
thought, rather than delivering knowledge of things in general. 
 
The obliteration of the whole or a totality expressible by images, as Rodowick 
suggests, is the most fundamental concept of the time-image as it provides ‘an 
original will to art’ that ‘transforms the intelligible material of cinema itself’ 
(1997:185). To understand the nature of the time-image more clearly, I return to 
Bergson’s description of the duration and creation of an artwork. This comparison 
between the cinematic time-image and the time of an artwork, I believe, provides 
Deleuze with a method for the creation of open philosophical concepts, such as 
the time-image, with cinema. As Bergson explains,  
 
Unforeseeable nothing… is everything in a work of art.  And it is this nothing 
that takes time. Nought as matter, it creates itself as form. The sprouting 
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and flowering of this form are stretched out on an unshrinkable duration, 
which is one with their essence. So of the works of nature. Their novelty 
arises from an internal impetus which is progress or succession, which 
confers on succession a peculiar virtue or which owes to succession the 
whole of its virtue—which, at any rate, makes succession, or continuity of 
interpenetration in time, irreducible to a mere instantaneous juxtaposition in 
space. (1998: 341) 
 
The Oxford Dictionary of English (2003) explains how the root of the word emotion 
is predicated on the Latin word ‘emovere’ which means to move outwards. Creative 
emotion drives us to create, it is initially non- figurative and self-generating and has 
the potential to create completely new ideas and transform these into perceptible 
forms. Inner emotions do not exist as ‘isolated inner states’ as Bergson explains at 
their ‘lowest level it is very like a turning of our states of consciousness towards the 
future’ (2001: 10).  As these states are attracted towards the future our movements 
require less effort and our emotions, ‘ideas and sensations succeed one another 
with greater rapidity’ (Bergson, 2001: 10). 
 
In My Breath I Drew 4  reveals this motion outwards, as the journey of 
unrepresentable creative emotion and the time-image, towards the metamorphosis 
of a video image becoming. I switch the digital camera to record it captures the film 
image until its tape reaches its end. One hour of a film openly recording its own 
creation, an aspect ratio of 16:9, changing moving, becoming.  Close up, medium 
or long shot are not the point here. I reverse the event and speed up the moving 
image in post production, digitally sixty minutes become six. The video-image 
begins as if you had breathed out into a plane of immanence. Breath, a thick 
opaque mist of white light caught on the cool morning air. White light, like white 
sound is tactile, it touches us, touching eyes and ears, creating feelings of vibrating 
sensations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For the soundtrack to In my Breath I Drew see Appendix 3.  
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Figure 7. Stills from In my Breath I drew 
 
This gaseous perception is filled with dispersing molecular photons, which reveal 
speeding light. White light shifting, differentiating as a thinly sketched horizontal 
line, gradually drifts in and out of view, midway across the screen. Light refracted 
and reflected upon water droplets, silhouetted shadows of depth, shading forms of 
degrees and intensities. Variable lines in flight, in any space and at any moment 
whatsoever, matter and light form shifting shapes of landscape, penciled from 
tumbling misty molecules. A plane of immanence, white light speeds in all 
directions, refracted and reflected, integrating, photons, protons, electrons, matter, 
eyes and brain. White light takes its time, while on a plane of immanence shadowy 
images emerge, drawing, painting, colouring. Amorphous forms, absent of 
crystalline structure, shapeless, vague, indefinable, hazy, movement. 
 
Submerged, surrounded by images mingling their complex paths together. A bloc of 
space-time, a decentred misty light of gaseous perception flows onto and 
fluctuates from the screen. Light projected onto digital photosights, charged couple 
devices, volts and pixels create a frame of reference, a shot to the open whole.  
 
Gaseous molecules and digital pixels, fluctuating, shifting, dispersing, 
differentiating at individual and coexisting times, filmic perception-images of the 
material world appear.  Together, drawing sketchy vibrating lines of light in flight, 
finding with quantitative and qualitative methods any-elements-whatever, which 
move and merge together, into the emerging colour of the landscape beyond.  
 
The shot clears over the length of the film, revealing a frame of reference to the 
emerging landscape. The movement of the whole openly unfolds as the camera 
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brushes against light, its lens probing like the nib of a pen or the bristles of a 
paintbrush, recording painted continuous changes of fluid gaseous perception into 
form and colour. A process directly informed by our changing states, the changing 
nature of our external world, the changing nature of light, image and the open 
whole. The continuous painting of an image of the duration of our creative emotion, 
becoming. 
 
Starting at the end, I press play and rewind, I watch sixty minutes compressed 
back into six minutes. Waiting, I follow the image back to its beginning, a block of 
space-time, any moment-what-ever, any space-what-ever emerges. By reversing 
the film, I watch its becoming, which is its beginning, and then I watch it back 
again. Each time is a new time becoming as we watch the video again. As Bergson 
explains, ‘we are the artisans’ of our own life and each of our moments is creation, 
‘just as the talent of the painter…. is modified under the very influence of the works 
he produces, so each of our states, at the moment of its issue, modifies our 
personality, being indeed the new form that we are just assuming’, we are 
continually creating ourselves, as the ‘creation of self by self’ (1998:7). 
 
To grasp a better understanding of how Bergson’s coexistent time occurs, the next 
chapter will examine the importance of memory and perception to the three forms 
of past, present and future time. 
 
 
 
  
	  	  	   44	  
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
Portrait of Myself: Bergson’s 
Method of Memory and Perception 
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CHAPTER 2: 
 
Portrait of Myself: Bergson’s Memory and Perception 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. 
Henri Bergson 
 
Perception and memory never really exist or function as separate entities, although 
as Bergson shows, we can differentiate between their individual definitions and 
individual potentials. My video making process, explores how the spectator/listener 
of film, uses perception and memory to move beyond the presented video image 
and enter their own duration and creative emotion, as their self portrait becoming. I 
will consider some of the influences on Gertrude Stein’s creative production and 
the significance of Bergson’s theories of perception and memory, for the visual 
perceiver and creator of new work. This research will then inform my reflection on 
the production and perception of my video Portrait of Myself and also briefly note 
the relevance of Deleuzian cinematic concepts of the movement-image and time-
image for the image.  
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The following words convey Gertrude Stein’s search for a means to express her 
philosophy and methodology through her creative work: 
 
I must find out what is moving inside them that makes them, and I must find 
out how I by the thing moving excitedly in me can make a portrait of them. 
(Gertrude Stein, quoted in Meyer, 2003: p117)  
 
Her investigative working process led her to research subjects such as human 
biology, physiology, neurology, emotion, painting, sound, music, theatre, cinema 
and Bergsonian philosophy. I link Stein, Bergson and Deleuze’s thought together 
through a discussion of their methods and creative theories and use these to help 
articulate my method of production for the video Portrait of Myself.  
 
	  
 
Figure 9. Stills from Portrait of Myself (8 min) Digital video - tracking shot with sound - 
Bergson: Memory and perception 
 
Stein, Bergson and Deleuze’s ideas will also assist my understanding of what 
moves inside myself as the maker and viewer of video, as well as for other 
spectators of video. I suggest that when the spectator of video steps into their role 
as the perceiver of the artwork, they encounter their own experience of memory, 
creative emotion, intuition and duration, which implicates them in their own self-
portrait, beyond the on-screen image. Every viewer’s visual perception of the on-
screen image engages in a process that intermingles their perception of the video 
with their coexistent memories. Throughout this integrated discussion, I will argue 
that I do not need to find what moves inside the audience in order to make a 
portrait of them, because the audience finds creative emotion within themselves, 
which creates their own self-portrait and something completely new.  
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Stein’s early influences included psychology, neuroscience and Munsterberg’s film 
theory, which she encountered during her studies at Harvard and Yale as a medical 
student.  Biological and scientific models of writing inspired her creative work and 
her academic research included the histology of the central nervous system, the 
embryonic brain and the functioning of neurons. She also investigated the Nucleus 
of Darkschewitsch, which is found in the mid-brain and is part of three oculomotor 
nuclei that are important for eye movement and changes in visual attention (Meyer, 
2003: 75). 
 
Her mentor William James introduced her to his doctrines of Radical Empiricism 
and emotion5. Radical Empiricism challenged Kantian divisions of subjective and 
objective knowledge and rejected the domination of sense data because it split 
‘knowledge from emotional investment’ (Meyer, 2003: 11). James stressed the 
importance of process and conjunctive and disjunctive relations and published one 
of the first widely accepted theories of emotion, known as the James-Lange theory. 
These ideas influenced Stein’s texts such as The Making of Americans (1925) that 
experiments with Radical Empiricism, scientific investigation, repetition, 
recollection, human portraits and Stein’s perception of present time. As Stein 
explains in The Making of Americans she ‘tried to make a history of the world’ 
wanting to write ‘the life of every individual who could possibly live on the earth’, 
she developed a diagram of everybody she watched and tried to convey ‘every 
variety of human experience… every type, every style and nuance’ (Cited in 
Bartlett Hass,1971:16). 
 
While completing The Making of Americans, Stein began to write and speak the 
portraits of   painters such as Matisse and Picasso. Painting challenged her 
thought, creativity and composition, shifting her influences away from scientific 
investigation and analysis towards modernist painting. Along with many artists of 
the time, Stein developed her creativity alongside Bergsonian philosophical 
thought. Bergson considered evolution to be a creative process that coincided with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Appendix 4 for James’ influence on A.Damasio re: Descartes, emotion  and neuroscience. 
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artistic creation and unconscious states, such as memory, emotion, free will, and 
intuition, continuing the creation of the completely new.  
 
Stein, and her brother Leo, invested in paintings by artists such as Cézanne, 
Matisse, Picasso and Picaba. Cézanne was fascinated by light, colour sensation 
and geometrical form and how he could give equal value, to every part of his 
canvas. Cézanne’s work influenced Stein and Picasso. Stein experimented with 
words of equal value and Picasso began cubism, painting areas of equal value. 
Picasso painted Stein’s portrait while she wrote and spoke his. Stein developed a 
new interest in her observation of perceived things and their visual description. As 
Walker describes, 
 
Names of colours and adjectives describing the qualities of light are 
abundant in Stein’s ‘Portraits of Things’. Lines and outlines, surfaces, 
centres, lengths, widths, and measurements evoke the compositional 
resources and structures of paintings. (1984:137) 
 
During this exploration of portraiture Stein realised she had overlooked the 
importance of visual perception and the impact of memory on her work. Her 
investigation of the ‘continuous present’ alongside human portraiture led to her 
realisation that the way she perceived things in the present, and remembered 
things and humans from the past, contradicted and compromised her ability to 
create the completely new. Stein explains, 
 
I listened and talked but that was not all I did in knowing at any present time 
when I was stating anything what anything was. I was also looking, and that 
could not be entirely left out. The trouble with including looking…was that in 
regard to human beings looking inevitably carried in its train realizing 
movements and expression and as such forced me into recognizing 
resemblances, and so forced remembering and in forcing remembering 
caused confusion of present with past and future time. (Stein, 1997: v) 
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For Stein, painters created still lives ‘to be certain that looking was not confusing 
itself with remembering. Remembering with then takes the form of suggesting in 
their painting in place of having actually created the thing in itself that they are 
painting’ (Stein, 1997: vi). Stein’s text Tender Buttons (1914) paints portraits of 
objects that are textually integrated with subjective states. Meyer explains that 
Tender Buttons was Stein’s ‘first conscious struggle with the problem of correlating 
sight, sound and sense’ with ‘the rhythm of the visible world’ (Meyer, 2003:37). 
Stein explains she wrote ’portraits of rooms and food and everything because there 
I could avoid this difficulty of suggesting remembering more easily…than if I were 
to describe human beings’ (Stein, 1997: vi). She experimented with writing until she 
found ‘the movement of the human being’ (Meyer, 2003: 202).  
 
This led Stein to cinema, which offered her ‘a new way of understanding sight and 
sound in relation to emotion and time,’ (Meyer, 2003:203). For Stein, ‘one sentence 
coming after another sentence makes a succession’ and ‘the paragraph needs to 
continue making a succession in order to convey the impression of movement and 
emotion’ (Meyer, 2003: 271-275). Similar to each film frame, every sentence 
needed to be ‘infinitesimally different from the one before’ (cited in Meyer, 2003: 
202). Haas provides the following insight into Stein’s use of cinema, 
 
Now the prose takes on a cinematic style. Each statement made is uniquely 
felt, uniquely formed in the present, and is succeeded by another, slightly 
different, like the successive frames of a film that build an image which 
seems to prolong itself in the present for a given period of time. (1971:49) 
 
A sentence for Stein ‘is not emotional a paragraph is’ and sentences and 
paragraphs are similar to the functioning of sensations and emotions, just as 
‘emotional paragraphs’ are ‘made up of unemotional sentences’ so ‘emotions were 
composed of unemotional sensations’ (Meyer, 2003: 281). Stein’s aim though, 
instead of trying to define their disjunctive and conjunctive functions or their 
specific cause, was to explore how grammar could fuse sentences and paragraphs 
together. She also rejected the division of mental and emotional experience and 
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believed ‘the human mind no more precedes or causes human activity than 
emotions determine their apparent symptoms’ (Meyer, 2003: 116). Food, objects, 
rooms, sensations, feelings and emotions are words painted together as ’a new 
affirmation that human existence is intimately involved with the physicality of matter 
and of flesh’ (Walker, 1984:139). Our body surface, is the boundary between our 
internal and external experiences and the only part of space, which is at the same 
time both felt and perceived. Importantly, object and subject, internal and external 
are closely entwined within Stein’s text. 
 
Meyer points out Stein’s writing needs to be understood as ‘a feeling for the 
organism’ as something more than its parts, more than its past, more than its 
purely mechanical features, as an embodiment of that which makes the earth itself’ 
(Meyer, 2003: 574). Tender Buttons creates portraits of object and subject in the 
continuous present becoming. Stein had realised she needed to resolve the 
problem of present perception, remembrance and the confusion of past, present 
and future time frames. When past remembrances had too strong a hold on her 
present perception of the thing she observed, it merely remained as repetitive 
imitation and as such, to the detriment of her creation of the novel and completely 
new.  
 
PERCEPTION: 
 
Visual perception for Bergson, is concerned with matter and the external material 
world, which includes our representable body. Memory on the other hand, relates 
to our internal, unobservable states and virtual experience, which informs our 
virtual images and their materialisation into observable forms. Our visual 
perception of matter, whether of objects, sculpture, paintings or projected video, 
assists our observation and production of external things in the representable 
present. While memory, is our preservation of past and present experiences, which 
inform our virtual subjective images, and our present perception and interaction, 
with real external objects.  
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Bergson’s purpose is to show how when the individual differences of perception 
and memory are overlooked, we muddle their specific functions and potentials. As 
a result, perception becomes confused as an internal subjective vision, which leads 
us to separate the experience of our inner selves from that of the external world. 
Perception is often deemed to differ from memory only because of its greater 
intensity, due to the vibration of the nerves involved in processing sensations of 
sight and sound. As a result, perception has been misinterpreted as a sensation 
that manifests into an internal subjective vision, in a similar way to memory. The 
consequence is that objects of matter and our representation of them, as images, 
have been understood to exist in opposition to one another, instead of being 
involved in a continual process of becoming.  
 
Bergson acknowledges his discussion in Matter and Memory (2002) appears 
dualistic because it asserts the individual natures of both perception and memory 
and as such, matter and spirit (Bergson, 2002: 9). His purpose though, is to resolve 
the Cartesian dualisms of body and mind. By differentiating between the individual 
natures of perception and memory, he identifies our misunderstanding of their 
individual functions, as well as our misconception of the object (in space) and 
subject (in time/duration) divide. He shows how, when we muddle perception with 
memory we confuse the existence of real material objects with our virtual 
subjective representation of them, which leaves us wondering whether external 
things truly exist. Matter however, as Bergson explains, is perceived exactly where 
the object of matter itself exists and should not be misconstrued as having the 
innate ability to generate representations within our self (Bergson, 2002: 10). 
 
This problematic division between object and subject and the barrier between the 
artist and viewer’s consciousness can be broken down, as Bergson reveals, by 
focusing on our ability to visually perceive the universe as an image. He develops 
a double system of images that relate to inorganic and organic images of matter. 
Both types of matter image can be affected by each other and all universal matter 
images that surround them. However, in the organic system the image ‘receives 
the action of the other images on one of its facets and reacts to them on another 
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facet’ (Deleuze 1997: 61). In other words unlike inorganic images of matter, 
organic images of matter are able to choose whether to respond or not, to other 
surrounding images.  
 
There are two types of visual perception that Bergson defines, one related to our 
conscious perception in the present (as when watching my video) that with our 
individual memory images and sensations registers whether our initial visual 
perception requires an appropriate action or response. The other type of 
perception is pure perception, which is impersonal and untainted by individual 
experience and subjective memories. Pure perception shows that material things 
exist independently of our perception of them. Objects or screened moving images 
are not constructed from our furtive imaginations and do not exist within our 
internal subjective vision (as this place belongs to memory). For proof of this, we 
need only view our own body that we perceive as a visually representable object in 
the material world that is perceptible by other visually endowed living things. 
External things exist without our perception of them, although their perception 
requires a living organism such as ourselves, in order to be perceived. Which 
means both the image of the object and our perception of it, can be referred to as 
the same image/ thing. This breaks down our barriers between space and time. 
Our conscious observation of real objects does not construct their image. Instead 
conscious perception allows our subjective representation the time to choose, the 
section of the external image (or in this case my video) that is most relevant to our 
present circumstance. 
 
Our visual representation of light and matter (or video-images) dilutes the detail of 
the actual object itself because we select only what interests us most. This image 
of an object/video, as Bergson shows, is less than the material thing but more than 
its representation. The representation differs from the original image of the object 
by degree, our individual perception creates a transition from the original image of 
the object itself, into its representation and existence within ourselves. The  
 
 
	  	  	   53	  
transition from the object’s image of itself into its being within our individual 
perception, subtracts information from this representation. Representation is a 
diminution of the image: the transition from image to pure perception is a selection.  
 
Whether observing video, computer and film images, or any other object that exits 
in the external visible world, the image seen by a human (or another organic living 
image with visual capabilities) is exactly what Bergson refers to as perception. 
Perception, even though it is not the actual object or digital video image itself, 
provides us with a representation of real world visual information that helps us to 
isolate and focus on the specific external image that concerns us most. The body 
can then influence other images/objects and choose from amongst them the most 
appropriate action to take. We experience change due to our body’s influence on 
external images, as well as their influence on our body. 
 
Importantly, by elucidating the reality of the existence of images of real things, such 
as humans, houses, photographs or my digital video images and our image of 
them, Bergson challenges philosophical views that assume perception is 
speculative and that we construct our images of knowledge from sense data alone. 
Instead, he proposes our image of external things, in this case my video images, 
are not simply formed from sensations but by the actual existence of external 
things/images themselves. He identifies this confused notion of perception as the 
origin of our misunderstanding of the external world and the reason for any 
objective and subjective polemic. When perception is misinterpreted as a sensation 
that manifests into an internal subjective vision it functions like a photographic 
process whereby an organ of perception (the eye), captures the image and 
develops it the brain. Perception then only seems to differ from our internal virtual 
images such as dream, imagination and memory images due to the greater 
intensity of nerve vibrations when processing light sensations. In this instance, 
 
Everything happens as though your perceptions were a result of the internal 
motions of the brain and issued in some sort from the cortical centres. It 
could not actually come from them since the brain is an image like others, 
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enveloped in the mass of other images, and it would be absurd that the 
container should issue from the content. (Bergson, Matter and Memory, 
2002: 41) 
 
The brain is incapable of creating either a part or whole of our representation of 
external images of the universe. Film, video and computer graphic images are not 
formed within our brains, as they exist exactly where we perceive their projection, 
whether on a cinema or multimedia screen. Our brain and nerves are themselves 
made from matter that can be observed as images, as in MRI technology and 
pathological investigation. The brain is neither a separate entity to the material 
world nor an organ responsible for the representation of images of matter-images.  
 
If we removed the images of the material world we would also eliminate the image 
of our brain and body and so we would cease to exist. On the other hand, if we 
erased the image of our brain and body from the universe, the universal image 
would continue without us. To consider the brain, sensation or body responsible for 
the entire image of the universe ‘is a contradiction in terms, since the brain is, by 
hypothesis, a part of this image’ (Bergson, Matter and Memory, 2002: 19). The 
brain and our sensori-motor activities help to process the things we visually 
perceive in the external world however; our brain does not construct visual images 
of external things. As Bergson states "the brain is an instrument of action and not 
of representation' and external forms such as my digital video work exists exactly 
where it is perceived, as an observable image in the material world (Bergson, 
Matter and Memory, 2002:74). 
 
Perception is primarily concerned with action and not speculation, and brain 
centres are more aligned with motor reaction than with conscious perception. The 
brain conveys received movements to appropriate organs of reaction or extends 
this movement to the entire nervous system. The nervous system has developed in 
relation to our reflex actions, and the brain and spinal cord are merely different by 
degree and not in kind, 
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Between what is called the perceptive faculty of the brain and the reflex 
functions of the spinal cord. The cord transforms into movements the 
stimulation received, the brain prolongs into reactions which are merely 
nascent, but in the one case as in the other, the function of the nerve 
substance is to conduct, to co-ordinate, or to inhibit movements. (Bergson, 
Matter and Memory, 2002:24) 
 
Our auditory and visual senses further extend our relationship to a larger variety of 
objects over a greater distance. This increases the amount of uncertainty and 
hesitation we experience and enhances the choices we make because our 
experiences are more diverse and profound than those, of other matter. Perception 
and action help us to respond to external images, which the brain communicates 
through motor-sensori responses (see Appendix 5 – for sample of brain areas 
related by neuroscience to our perception of emotion, sound and image). 
Perception provides the conditions required for action, and not sensation. 
Sensations are ‘essentially due to what is actually present’ during our present 
perception of external things and the reason why, we do not understand how 
external stimulus such as light, colour and pixels provide us with the images we 
see (Bergson,1920: 141). As Bergson states, ‘no trace of the movements 
themselves can be actually perceived in the sensation which translates them’ 
(2001:34-35). This is because our body’s physiology is either wholly or partially in 
motion because of our nervous system, which functions and responds in the 
present without in-depth conscious analysis. Our nervous system when in its pure 
form, as Bergson points out, is the affective action of a sensible nerve, which exists 
between the external stimulant and the action we are about to carry out. Bergson 
states, 
 
I pass in review my different affections: it seems to me that each of them 
contains, after its kind, an invitation to act, with at the same time leave to 
wait and even do nothing.  I look closer and find movements begun, but not 
executed, the indication of a more or less useful decision, but not the 
constraint which precludes choice. I call up, I compare my recollections: I 
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remember that everywhere, in the organic world, I have thought I saw this 
same sensibility appear at the very same moment when nature, having 
conferred upon the living being the lower of mobility in space, gives warning 
to the species, by means of sensation, of the general dangers which 
threaten it, leaving to the individual precautions necessary for escaping from 
them. Lastly I interrogate my consciousness as to the part which it plays in 
affection: consciousness replies that it is present indeed, in the form of a 
feeling or sensation, at all the steps in which I believe I should take the 
initiative, and that fades and disappears as soon as my activity, by 
becoming automatic, shows that consciousness is no longer needed. 
Therefore, either all these appearances are deceptive, or the act in which 
the affective state issues is not one of those which might be rigorously 
deduced from antecedent phenomena, as a movement from a movement: 
and, hence, it really adds something new to the universe and so to its 
history (Matter and Memory, 2002: 17-18). 
 
Deleuze refers to the process of isolating specific events or actions within the 
material world through perception, as framing. For example, on an illuminated 
plane of the universe, we can choose a specific section from the whole flow of 
movement-images of matter that surround us, by selectively focusing on a slice of the 
open whole. The same could be said of a cinematographer when selecting and 
framing a specific area of the entire image before them. It could also be said of 
the viewer of the cinematographer’s video image, as they choose to focus on a 
specific area of the entire screened image. The movement-image as Deleuze 
defines it, is ‘the acentred set [ensemble] of variable elements which act on a 
centre, and which vary in relation to it’ (Deleuze, 1997:217). When movement-
images relate to a centre of indetermination they becomes perception-images 
that travel between ‘universal variation, total, objective and diffused perception’ 
and our present view, which is ‘unicentred subjective perception’ (Deleuze 1997: 
64). 
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Bogue explains how a ‘sensory-motor schema organizes and coordinates the 
perceptions, feelings, and actions of each living image’ (2003:4). Our brain 
provides the ‘gap between action and reaction’ and our sensory perceptive 
surfaces further complicate action and reaction by allowing us to choose and 
isolate our encounter with other images of matter (Deleuze 1997: 62-3). 
Perception exists to one side of this gap or interval, while action exists on the 
other. We form an interval between received and executed movement-images as 
we process our sensations of their light. As we process this universal objective 
information, we are able to automatically respond to it and subjectively choose to 
ignore, contemplate, pause or change direction accordingly. 
 
For Deleuze, human perception although not restricted to these, is an 
amalgamation of three main image types, which form the movement-image and 
its representation in cinema. Whether digital or analogue, cinema and video offer 
moving-images that we frame as moving visual slices of duration. Deleuze connects 
the basic cinematic forms of the frame, shot and montage to the open whole of durée, 
which is indirectly present in the open whole in each mobile slice. The frame, shot and 
montage offer three ‘manifestations of time, three different ways in which the open 
whole of durée unfolds itself in movement-images’ (Bogue, 2003:4). The cinematic 
movement-image incorporates the shot, frame and montage and replicates our 
perception of the world, and the on-screen character’s perception of their film 
world. Deleuze, defines the three main, spatially determined shots, which exist 
between the film frame and montage as follows, 
 
1. Perception-Image: ‘set [ensemble] of variable elements which act and react on 
each other’. 
2. Affection-Image: ‘that which occupies the gap between an action and a 
reaction, that which absorbs an external action and reacts on the inside.’ 
3. Action-Image: ‘reaction of the centre to the set [ensemble]’ (1997: 217). 
 
The perception-image relates to the long shot, the action-image to the medium shot 
and the affection-image to the close-up. The amalgamation of the three shots 
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constitutes montage, which combine to form an indirect image of time. Usually one 
type of montage dominates the others, resulting in three varieties of perceptive, 
affective and active montage.  
 
Between receiving and executing movement we experience affection, which is 
our delayed reaction to received events. Bergson defines affection as a ‘motor 
tendency in a sensible nerve’ because affection’s movement is a lived qualitative 
state (1991: 55–56). Affection also marks ‘the coincidence of the subject and the 
object in pure quality’, as Deleuze states, affection, 
 
occupies the interval…without filling it in or filling it up. It surges in the 
centre of determination that is to say in the subject, between a perception 
which is troubling in certain respects and a hesitant action. It is a 
coincidence of subject and object, or the way in which the subject 
perceives itself, or rather experiences itself or feels itself ‘from the inside. 
(1997: 65) 
 
This occurs when we prioritize specific immobile organs, such as our nose, ears 
and eyes, which are actively receptive in the material world. And use the face to 
express our internal feelings and reactions, which Deleuze defines as the 
affection-image and relates to the close up of the face, which expresses nerve 
movement in relation to internal emotion that lies hidden in the body. As he states, 
‘movement ceases to be that of translation in order to become movement of 
expression, that is to say quality, simple tendency stirring up an immobile 
element’ (1997: 66). 
 
As living images we are ‘an instrument of analysis in regard to the movement 
received, and an instrument of selection in regard to the movement executed’ 
(Deleuze 1997: 62). When we are actively involved with other objects we 
encounter the action-image, perception as Deleuze states, is ‘master of space in 
the exact measure in which action is master of time’ (1997: 65).  
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We are an interval that can be articulated as space in relation to perception and 
time in relation to action. For Deleuze, 
 
actions undergone are isolated by the frame and hence,…are forestalled, 
anticipated…on the other hand, executed reactions are no longer 
immediately with the action undergone. By virtue of the interval, these are 
delayed reactions, which have time to select their elements, to organise 
them or to integrate them into a new movement, which is impossible to 
conclude by simply prolonging the received excitation. Such reactions 
which present something unpredictable or new will be called action. (1997: 
62) 
 
However, our perceptual process alone never offers a complete picture of the 
external things we observe because it is tainted by our virtual illusions. Bergson 
explains that ‘with the immediate and present data of our senses, we mingle a 
thousand details out of our past experience’ (Matter and Memory, 2002: 33). To 
have any significance beyond our present circumstance, perception and sense 
perception need to be mixed alongside memory. 
 
Memory 
Importantly, perception needs to be understood as different in kind from memory, 
otherwise we end up considering matter, as if it were constructed from our 
imagination alone. Visual perception then, appears to merely function as a dream 
or hallucination, instead of assisting our comprehension of the real external world, 
which our real body exists in.  As Bergson points out, if 
 
our perception of a present object is something of that object itself, our 
representation of the absent object, as in Memory, must be a phenomenon 
of quite another order than Perception, since between presence and 
absence there are no degrees, no intermediate stages. (Bergson, Matter 
and Memory, 2002: 236) 
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Bergson reminds us that a rose will smell differently for you than for me because of 
our individual memories of all the roses we have personally experienced, 
throughout our lives (2001:161-162).  This also implies, that ‘when we pass from 
'pure' Perception to Memory, we definitely abandon matter for spirit’.6 (Bergson, 
Matter and Memory, 2002: 235) 
 
Bergson places memory, alongside our conscious and unconscious states.  
Consciousness, he claims, is ‘the characteristic note of the present’ in that it is our 
active lived experience in the present (Bergson, Matter and Memory 2002: 141). 
Consequently, anything unrelated to our present conscious action, becomes 
relevant to our unconscious memory. Memory forms two types one ‘real’ and the 
other ‘pure’ and both can be mixed together. Real memory is habitual and provides 
a focus for psychological studies, it relates to the repetition of information, 
automatic behaviour, sensori-motor mechanisms and bodily perception in our 
conscious present. Real memory is important for everyday life, however its function 
can also mask pure memory and its potential to spontaneously remember events. 
Pure memory recollects information at an unconscious level, retaining all the 
personal memories of the entirety of our existence. Unconscious memory is also 
able to manifest into our present experience through our conscious self. This 
activity results in a coexistent experience that mixes perception and recollection 
together, in a potentially creative way.  
 
Bergson believes when we find the concept of the unconscious difficult to grasp, it 
is usually because ‘we hold consciousness to be the essential property of psychical 
states, so that a psychical state cannot, it seems, cease to be conscious without 
ceasing to exist’ (Bergson, Matter and Memory, 2002: 141). But this is like claiming 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For Bergson,	  memory is ‘the intersection of mind and matter’ (Matter and Memory, 2002: xii.). 
Memory is not a state of the brain, although ‘the brain continues the remembrance’ and provides 
memory with ‘a hold on the present by the materiality, which it confers upon it, but pure memory, is 
a spiritual manifestation,’ (Matter and Memory, 2002: 320). Bergson further explains, ‘Memory must 
be, in principle, a power absolutely independent of matter. If then, spirit is a reality, it is here, in the 
phenomenon of Memory that we may come into touch with it experimentally’ (Matter and Memory, 
2002:81).   
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material things no longer exist because we have diverted our eyes and stopped 
perceiving them, or that our past is erased, simply because we have stopped 
remembering it at our present conscious moment. Even if we are unable to 
remember a specific event at a specific time it does not prove all-previous events 
are forgotten. Even the destruction of memories due to brain injury, as Bergson 
explains, is simply a break of the continuous progress by which memories are 
actualized (2002: 126).  
 
Memory is not a function of a particular brain area nor is it an archival store within 
the brain. As Bergson highlights, the localization of memory in the brain and brain 
mapping is far too mechanistic, he labels this notion the ‘box theory’7. For him, 
seeking the whereabouts of stored memory within the brain, would be as pointless 
as us humans expecting to find the words spoken during our mobile phone 
conversations, to be found lingering in space. Memory is a process that mostly 
functions on an unconscious level, as the survival of our entire past, which is a new 
and continually growing phenomenon. Memory is not a return to our past as found 
in psychological regressive therapies or science fiction, instead, memory helps us 
to define difference and thus create the new.  
 
Past remembrance for Stein, could not be part of her writing because to be creative 
it needed to describe a new present becoming. Stein’s creative problem, as Meyer 
points out, ‘was not to confuse imitation with creation’ (Meyer, 2003: 116). Any 
mechanical sense of narrative structure, history, remembering, resembling and all 
past tense needed to be removed from her writing. Similar to Stein’s problem, 
philosophy needs to find ways to create the completely new. Repetition has to be 
insistence of difference and not the repetition of the same.  
 
Stein’s writing shifts beyond traditional narrative structure ‘towards its redefinition 
as an internal process’, she states ‘narrative isn’t in your mind, but what is in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See A. Gunn 
http://www.ibiblio.org/HTMLTexts/John_Alexander_Gunn/Bergson_And_His_Philosophy/chapter4.ht
ml Accessed 24 August 2012). 
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somebody else’s’ (Bartlett Haas, 1971:19). Stein expresses this idea in The 
Autobiography of Alice. B.Toklas (1933), a portrait that combines somebody else’s 
point of view of their life, with Stein’s perception and memory as both the writer and 
co-experiencer, of the autobiography.  
 
 
Figure 10. Alice. B. Toklas, Basket and Gertrude Stein 
 
The text results in our perception of coexistent memories in the present, which 
ultimately intermingles Stein’s and Alice’s self-portrait, as she creates her and her 
partner’s adventures of their shared world. This integration of Stein and 
Alice.B.Toklas’s memories, as well as the reader’s experience of them in the 
present creates a new coexistent experience in memory and perception, for 
everyone concerned. Memory needs to be accepted for its coexistence with our  
present perception, which is always new and never the repetition of the same. As 
Bergson states, ‘not even the artist, could have foreseen exactly what the portrait 
would be, for to predict it would have been to produce it before it was produced’. 
(Bergson, 1998: 6)  
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Stein’s problem with language was its inability to visually capture the present as it 
passes and creates, because it is always the differentiation of everything we knew 
and perceived before. Stein initially believed ‘the truth of human character resided 
in repetition and resemblance’. (Walker, 1984:136)  Eventually, influenced by a new 
and continued interest in paintings, painters and their observation of things to be 
painted, she found when ‘difference reigns supreme in the immediate sense-data 
of experience… there is no correct description of this ‘reality’ within the realm of 
language. (Walker, 1984:136) Instead, Stein chose language that emphasised the 
process character of nature and (similar to the process of watching an emerging 
video image) its moment-to-moment novelty. Her spoken and written portrait of 
Picasso, clearly demonstrates his moving, changing and emerging personality, 
alongside ours as we either read or listen to her speak his portrait8. Picasso 
himself spent ninety sittings and eight years painting Stein’s portrait, which when 
criticized for not looking like her, he replied, ‘that does not make any difference, 
she will’. (Meyer, 2003:157)  
 
Figure11. Gertrude Stein (Painted by Picasso) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For sample of Stein’s text and voice recording see 
http://www.english.upenn.edu/%7Ejenglish/Courses/Spring02/104/steinpicasso.html (Accessed 24 
August 2012) 
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Picasso provides the following insight into his creative process, as well as its 
significance for continuous novel creativity, and the creativity of the perceiver of his 
work. He states, 
 
A picture is not thought out and settled beforehand. While it is being done it 
changes as one’s thoughts change. And when it is finished, it still goes on 
changing, according to the state of mind of whoever is looking at it. A picture 
lives a life like a living creature undergoing the changes imposed on us by 
our life from day to day. (cited in Harrison, Wood, 2004:508)  
 
Artwork, when considered through Stein and Picasso’s ideas, could be said to 
encourage the viewer/listener to enter their own creative emotion, enabling their 
generation of new ideas beyond those presented in the artwork.  
 
My video, Portrait of Myself, is one of three tracking shots created for an art 
installation. Each video portrays the same environment, subject matter and shot 
type, although the shots were recorded at different times of day (e.g. afternoon, 
evening, sunny and cloudy day). This allowed me to consider how differing light 
might affect the viewers’ perception and experience of self-portraiture. However, 
for the sake of clarity in the theoretical discussion, I focus on one shot (fig 9).   
 
The soundtrack for the work also tracks backwards and was created when the 
video image was being digitally captured onto a computer. I recorded the audio 
feedback from the computer’s speakers with a microphone. I then experimented 
with the intensity of the sound by moving the microphone nearer or further away 
from the speakers.  For the installation, the sound would be played on stereo 
speakers. Left speakers would be placed next to the screened image and right 
speakers at the opposite end of the space to the screen. The sound would then 
pan from left to right speakers, at the same rate as the video image tracks 
backwards. This would allow the perceiver of the work to experience the movement 
of the sound from the front to the back of the space. 
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Portrait of Myself also takes note of Gertrude Stein’s creative methodology; by 
portraying video images untainted by human presence it instead reveals the video 
image as a process of change and becoming. This more easily disrupts our 
temptation to separate recollection memory from our present perception of the 
video and new memory becoming.  Another reason for removing the presence of 
an on-screen character from the video image, is to ensure that Deleuze’s concept 
of the moving-image, is not simply aligned with an on-screen character and their 
action. Portrait of Myself avoids fuelling thought and emotion through the on-screen 
representation of character emotion, action and reaction, and removes our 
identification with a specific genres or narrative structure. Without these 
confusions, we can more easily (break down our motor-sensory experience of the 
image) apply the movement-image, to its significance for both the video maker’s 
and the viewer’s perception, and their coexistent experience of the video.  
 
Portrait of Myself investigates self-portraiture through the viewer’s observation of 
the video image. The enunciation of the video title by the viewer, implicates them in 
their own experience of self-portraiture, as they engage with the on-screen video 
image throughout its projection.  
 
Instead of just observing an on-screen character, this ultimately places the viewer 
within a durational process, which mingles visual perception, with coexistent 
feelings, emotions and memories as a self-portrait becoming. Here it is interesting 
to note, in relation to self-portraiture, Deleuze’s inquiry into whether it is possible to 
discover the ‘dividing-in-two’ of the subject in thought and in art, which he sums up as 
follows, 
 
It is the Cogito: an empirical subject cannot be born into the world without 
simultaneously being reflected in a transcendental subject which thinks it and in 
which it thinks itself. And the Cogito of art: there is no subject which acts 
without another which watches it act, and which grasps it as acted, itself 
assuming the freedom of which it deprives the former. Thus two different egos 
[moi] one of which, conscious of its freedom, sets itself up as independent 
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spectator of a scene which the other would play in a mechanical fashion. But 
this dividing-in-two never goes to the limit. It is rather an oscillation of the 
person between two points of view on himself a hither-and-thither of the spirit.  
(1997:73) 
 
Memory for Bergson is virtual and ‘a power absolutely independent of matter. If 
then, spirit is a reality, it is here, in the phenomenon of Memory that we may come 
into touch with it experimentally’ (Bergson, Matter and Memory, 2002:73). Memory 
is not a state of the brain, although ‘the brain continues the remembrance’ and 
provides memory with ‘a hold on the present by the materiality, which it confers 
upon it, but pure memory, is a spiritual manifestation’ (Bergson, Matter and 
Memory, 2002:240).  
 
We usually connect our everyday memories with our present circumstance, 
however, if we only existed in the present, we would simply react to all immediate 
stimuli through impulsive behaviour. Conversely, if we remained in the past, our 
memories would surface into consciousness as if dream images, without benefit for 
the purpose of our present action in the material world. Through these two types of 
memory we discover the meeting place between our virtual images, as in the depth 
of our dreams, and our impulsive habitual memories, which are relevant to our 
actions in the material world. In other words our internal unrepresentable virtual 
memories are able to surface at-any-moment-whatsoever, onto a representable 
plane within our conscious present.  
 
Bergson, compares memory’s motion to two virtual rotational movements, one that 
extends outwards, while the other reverses the initial rotation into contraction. 
Similar to focusing a digital video camera, as we rotate and focus the camera lens, 
we find indefinable forms that gradually become singular images that extend into a 
frame, where all parts are in sharp and equal focus. When this action is reversed 
the opposite process occurs and we encounter once again, the complete 
abstraction of images. This rotation of the lens between extension and contraction, 
lends itself to Bergson's concept of the virtual, as he states, ‘this movement from 
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interpenetration to fragmentation, from unity to multiplicity, (and even from 
multiplicity to juxtaposition) is always potential or virtual’ (Lawlor, Leonard and 
Moulard, Valentine, 2012). Intellectual effort might initially begin as a vague and 
abstract idea of the thing conceived, however it finally moves from an abstract 
plane of thought and ideas, to a place of tangible images. Thinking is more than 
mere contemplation as we embrace the whole movement of memory from 
contemplation to action. 
 
Although diagrams are incapable of representing memory and its virtual and 
unrepresentable potential and properties, Bergson uses the image of an inverted 
cone to explain how memory functions (see Figure 12a: below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002, Matter & Memory  
page 152, Fig 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure: 12a 
 
 
The cone represents the entirety of our past experience that mostly exists as 
unconscious memory, which surfaces onto a plane that represents our conscious 
present. There are different planes of memory with the largest part of the cone 
containing our past. Through a process of mobility we descend down from the 
cones base, which is the past, throughout different planes of memory and towards 
its pinnicale, which represents our present perception and action. As this motion 
Continuously surviving 
memories 
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downwards occurs we discover an infinite amount of areas of the past that also 
relate to our proximity in the present. Descending memories can thus be 
considered to be mobile and progressive.   
 
I will use his notion of the cone to explain how perception and memory might 
function, during both the production and consequent observation of Portrait of 
Myself. This combines the video image, the video maker, and the perceiver of the 
image, in a coexistent experience that transcends the divisions of time and space, 
and the Cartesian divide between matter and spirit. Portrait of Myself also 
considers how perception of the video image reveals its past, its passing, and its 
present becoming. An experience illuminated through Bergson’s Cone diagram.  
 
As a video maker, I utilise my previous memories and my spontaneous memories 
to assist my action with camera equipment and video technology in the 
representable world. On a plane of immanence movement-images surround me as 
real light illuminates real matter that I capture with video technology. I set the lens 
focal length for a large depth of field, allowing the shot to frame images of equal 
focal value. I select and frame a moving perception-image, a shot, which is a 
mobile slice of the open whole. Framing a landscape, clouds steadily progress 
across the sky and water reeds sweep back and forth in the image below. Static, 
the camera waits as a breeze rhythmically pulls and pushes a sway of reeds, a 
breath, moving in and out and in and out again. Steadily, holding my breath, I ease 
from one foot to the other, sliding, tracking the camera backwards. 
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Continuously surviving memories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Visible Universe 
 
Figure12b. Matter and Memory (Bergson,2002: 152) 
Superimposed with stills from Portrait of Myself 
 
 
The inverted cone’s base [A and B] represents our continuously surviving 
unconscious memories. These memories can spontaneously arise, as when 
experiencing a dream or a new virtual image (Bergson, Matter and Memory 
2002:152). The cone’s pinnacle [S] is submerged within a horizontal plane that 
represents the visible universe. The root of memory progresses from pure and 
unconscious memory [A & B], were memories are a multiplicity of emotions and 
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choices, moving towards our present conscious state [S], where recollection 
memory and virtual images become relevant to our present waking moment, and 
our perception and action in the visible universe. While the largest part of the cone 
continues to contain our entire growing present and past, descending memories 
are mobile and progressive and emerge on different planes when of significance to 
our present circumstance. Progressive movement takes place between the two 
extremes of the cone, at the base pure memory is immobile contemplation, while at 
the cone’s pinnacle (point S) perception and action can take place (Bergson, 
Matter and Memory, 2002: 161). Through a process of mobility we descend from 
the cone’s base, which is of our past, to its pinnacle, which is our present 
perception. As this motion downward occurs we discover an infinite amount of 
areas of the past that relate to our proximity in the present.  
 
The tracking shot in Portrait of Myself simply illustrates this movement as the initial 
shot of the external landscape is always retained within the frame, as the shot 
tracks backwards (descends downwards) and retains/reframes new images 
throughout its duration. The video offers a simple illustration of each new moment 
of the image, which is retained in a collective and coexistent way through our 
perception of the image’s past, in the present, as it continuously survives in 
memory, and each new moment becomes. Tracking backwards we discover new 
images of equal value and focus, which coexist with the initial shot of the 
landscape. At the same time our multiplicity of memories can be mobile and 
progressive moving from pure and unconscious memory into our conscious present, 
ready for our immediate contemplation and action. This meeting place between 
impulsive action and the depth of dreams can at any-moment-whatsoever respond 
with automatic or spontaneous memories, which are specific to our present perception 
and circumstance.  Memory aids our ability to choose, differentiate and experiment 
with all our virtual memories that coexist with our perceived images of matter. 
Deleuze considers how, 
 
The idea of a contemporaneity of the present and the past has one final 
consequence: Not only does the past coexist with the present that has been, 
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but, as it preserves itself in itself (while the present passes), it is the whole, 
integral past: it is all our past, which coexists with each present…. The cone 
represents this complete state of coexistence, But such a state implies, 
finally, that in the past itself there appear all kinds of levels of profundity, 
marking all possible intervals in this coexistence…Each of these sections is 
itself virtual belonging to the being in itself of the past. Each of these 
sections or each of these levels includes not particular elements of the past, 
but always a totality of the past. It includes this totality at a more or less 
expanded or contracted level. This is the precise point at which contraction-
Memory fits with recollection-Memory and, in a way, takes over from it. 
Hence this consequence: Bergsonian duration is, in the final analysis, 
defined less by succession than by coexistence. (1991: 59-60) 
 
Looking back onto reeds, back past the still life of iron window handles, windows, 
window frames and to the side of the frame, the curves of a vase that reflects 
external light. The video image progressively proceeds, receding backwards, 
deeper into the interior room, into the present that proceeds, looking towards, 
framing coexistent clouds and reeds. Submerged amongst images, framed by a 
camera, pulsing inside with samples of light and electricity. Tracking offers an ease 
of movement that fits to the movement of grace. 
 
Grace, as Bergson explains, allows us to grasp how ‘the perception of ease in 
motion passes over into the pleasure of mastering the flow of time and of holding 
the future in the present’ (2001: 12). The feeling of grace appears to pave the way 
for further movement, as we discover ‘present attitudes in which future attitudes 
are pointed out’ and experienced with ease (Bergson, 2001: 12).  When the 
graceful movements of a dancer surrender to the rhythm of music, it enhances our 
experience of movement allowing us to feel almost in control. This induces a 
‘physical sympathy’ as we enter ‘into the feeling of grace’ that offers an ease of 
mobility which suggests a motion towards ourselves‘ of a virtual and even nascent 
sympathy’ (Bergson, 2001: 13). 
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The artist’s aim for Bergson should be to share the emotion that led to the creation 
of their work, to achieve this the artist needs to provide the ‘outward signs of’ their 
emotions’, which more easily transport the spectator/listener ‘into the indefinable 
psychological state’ first experienced by the artist (Bergson, 2001:18). As a result, 
the barriers placed by time and space between the artist’s consciousness and the 
audience’s, are removed, as Bergson states,  
 
the richer in ideas and the more pregnant with sensations and emotions is 
the feeling within whose limits the artist has brought us, the deeper and the 
higher shall we find the beauty thus expressed. The successive intensities 
of the aesthetic feeling thus correspond to changes of state occurring in us, 
and the degrees of depth to the larger or smaller number of elementary 
psychic phenomena which we dimly discern in the fundamental emotion. 
(Bergson2001: 18) 
 
Aesthetic feelings, for Bergson, convey a ‘progressive stepping in of new elements, 
which can be detected in the fundamental emotion’ to show a change of emotion’s 
nature (Bergson, 2001: 11). Sympathy, he claims, is mobility that emerges as the 
‘essence of higher grace’ and grows as aesthetic feelings diversify into various 
feelings, each ‘heralded by its predecessor… perceptible in it and then completely 
eclipses it’ (Bergson, 2001: 13). When artwork appears effortless, the art object stills 
the ‘resistant powers of our personality’, enabling us to enter ‘a state of perfect 
responsiveness’ (Bergson, 2001: 14). Opening us to the suggested feeling within 
the artwork, so that we can sympathize with it. The reason music usually has more 
of an affect on us than natural sound, as Bergson proposes, is because music 
suggests feelings, whereas nature expresses them.  
 
To understand the beautiful, Bergson examined art that addresses beauty through 
‘conscious effort’ and art that moves with ‘imperceptible steps from art to nature’ 
(Bergson, 2001: 14). Nature for Bergson is an artist in its own right and art should 
aim to suggest not express feeling because then art stops imitating nature 
(2001:16-17). The feeling of the beautiful, as Bergson finds, is not a specific feeling 
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although all feelings suggested and not caused acquire an aesthetic character. The 
merit of an artwork should not be measured by its power but rather the richness of 
its suggested feeling. Rather than simply dwelling on the intensity of an artwork, as 
Bergson points out, we can instead ‘instinctively distinguish degrees of depth or 
elevation’, as the artist’s suggested thoughts and feelings, combine to express their 
own history (2001:17). He further explains, 
 
If the art which gives only sensations is an inferior art, the reason is that 
analysis often fails to discover in a sensation anything beyond the sensation 
itself. But the greater number of emotions are instinct with a thousand 
sensations, feelings or ideas which pervade them: each one is then a state 
unique of its kind and indefinable, and it seems that we should have to re-
live the life of the subject who experiences it if we wished to grasp it in its 
original complexity. (Bergson, 2001:17) 
 
Even though a subjective experience the essence of emotion does not have to be an 
individualistic event, creative emotion similar to when music expresses love refers to 
more than one person. As Deleuze states, ‘when music cries, it is humanity, it is the 
whole of nature which cries with it…Truly speaking, it does not introduce these 
feelings in us; it introduces us rather into them, like the passers-by that might be 
nudged in a dance’ (2002:110). When music expresses love, as Deleuze explains 
‘The quality of love will depend on its essence and not upon its object’ (2002: 111).  
 
Olkowski states, ‘the “interval” between perception and memory, intelligence and 
social life is decisive for humans. And what appears in this interval is creative 
emotion’ (1996: 283-92). Deleuze points out that not only does emotion differ, ‘in 
nature both from intelligence and instinct, from both intelligent individual egoism and 
quasi-instinctive social pressure’ it also does not require an object but ‘merely an 
essence that spreads itself over various objects, animals, plants and the whole of 
nature’ (2002:110).  
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Creative emotion exists in the interval produced by social pressure, intellectual 
analysis and egoism. This virtual movement can shift from extensive unconscious 
memory and a plane of abstract images, towards contemplation and contraction, 
and a final act of creation with matter in the material world. Thus one is liberated 
from the confines of the everyday to experience the essence of creative emotion and 
thereby to become a creator of new objects and ideas. This is where both the viewer 
and maker, as creators of images interject with their own creative emotion. As our 
organic experience mixes together our perception of movement-images and their 
passing of present light, alongside our virtual expanding coexistent memories as 
new images becoming. 
 
	  
 
Figure 13. 
 
We are the interval between Deleuze’s concept of the movement-image and time-
image, which is where as the viewer/creator of images we interject with creative 
emotion.  Our perception of real video movement-images mixes with duration, our 
coexistent virtual memories and our perception of passing and present light 
becoming. To harness the potential of creative emotion Bergson suggests we utilize 
the interval and our circular play between the individual egoism and social convention 
where creative emotion is produced, to breakthrough into the new that exists beyond, 
the merely inventive, discursive or critical. Liberating ourselves from the confines of 
the everyday to experience the essence of creative emotion and become a creator of 
new ideas. Deleuze elucidates,	  the little interval ‘between the pressures of society and 
the resistance of intelligence’ defines a variability appropriate to human society’ 
(2002:111) where ‘creative emotion’ goes beyond individualistic problems and 
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constraints or the pressures of society. Creative emotion utilizes this ‘circular play’ so 
as to deconstruct the circular motion in a similar manner to in which memory uses 
‘excitation and reaction to embody recollections in images’. But what is the creative 
emotion if it isn’t a ‘cosmic Memory’ that actualizes all the levels at the same time. 
That liberates us from the plane that is relevant to ourselves, ‘in order to make him 
(us) a creator, adequate to the whole movement of creation? (2002:111)	  
 
 
	  
 
Figure 14. 
Gradually passing painted black window handles, window frames, progressing and 
retreating without montage techniques sinking into the interior still life of a room. 
The tracking shot breaks with conventional filmmaking techniques, providing an image 
whereby long shot, medium shot and close up, it could be argued, become coexistent 
as the shot progresses backwards. The internal body is a cinematic space that 
resonates with light, sounds, sensations, feelings and emotions, journeying 
towards creativity. The camera tracks through the long, medium and close shot 
continuously and coexistently framing and reframing the image. Narrative filmic 
structures interpenetrate, extending the cinematic interval, as the entirety of the 
video progresses, throughout its process of becoming. 
 
	  
 
Figure 15. 
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Shifting, tracking, bit by bit pivoting, turning my back on the image as I face the wall 
behind. Careful, that looking back does not just leave me lingering, simply 
remembering, remembering must be part of the present passing, as a new 
beginning, becoming. The camera’s perception is divorced from a specific point of 
view, neither purposefully aligning itself with an on-screen character, the viewer, or 
the video maker’s perception. Breaking with the motor sensory as no central 
character, narrative structure or specific response to an image is expected. 
Movement instead suggests the change of creative emotion and the duration of 
the whole.  
 
	  
 
Figure 16. 
I hold my breath, imperceptibly I try to move, sympathising with the camera, 
steadily and continuously tracking backwards. Capturing its own movement the 
camera frames and reframes its past and present becoming. The camera reaches 
the tracking's end. I turn the camera off and wait to join the viewer as a perceiver 
of the video.  
 
I switch the video player on. Light projected onto and emitted from a screen forms 
our initial perception of the video’s moving image, which with memory we retain as 
our representation of the external video light we watch unfolding and changing 
before us. Video’s projected light functions in a similar way to our visual perception 
and representation of real matter during our perception of it. The projected video 
image, similar to our perception of matter, lacks the detail of the original image of 
matter it captures, processes and projects. Throughout both our own and the 
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video’s duration, we need to continually refer to its present and our present and our 
virtual past images, to comprehend the video’s movement and progression over 
time.  
 
	  
 
Figure 17. 
 
Pixels and sensations interpenetrate with the video’s passing and becoming. Video 
sparks with the élan vital of electricity as an unrepresentable electrical camera 
consciousness, digital and analogue, charge, discharge, the visible and audible 
extend the unrepresentable for perceivers and their creative emotions. Digitally 
adding, linking interpenetrating, beginning again and again. 
  
The viewer exists in time and space, a collection, a multiplicity of qualitative and 
quantitative memories, perceptions and psychical states merge with our external 
body, joined alongside all other surrounding objects in space. Any-object 
whatsoever, any-space-whatsoever and any-time-whatsoever experienced through 
our unique body. The viewer becomes as spectator-creator, as the video itself is 
becoming. The viewer paints a self-portrait becoming as spectator-creator, as the 
video itself becomes.	  
 
Each element collaborates within our duration, to continue a process of creative 
emotion becoming. The past is connected with the unconscious and all our 
previous realities, while the present is creativity becoming.  
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Chapter 3: 
 
The Method of Orange: Bergson’s Method of Intuition 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Gilles Deleuze 
 
the present, reflected back into the past and perceived inside it as though in 
a mirror, is then what we call the unconscious of the past. The retroactivity 
of the present is at the origin of many philosophical delusions. (Bergson, 
The Sources of Morality and Religion, 2002:308)  
 
Bergson’s Method of Intuition refuses to privilege either language or mathematics, 
or any other symbolic representation, which could result in a ready-made 
philosophy and consequently, render the creation of anything completely new, 
impossible. Bergson again takes issue with Kant’s philosophy by opposing Kant’s 
interpretation of intuition, which is directly linked to a consciousness that is already 
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given by common sense. As a result, Bergson turned intuition into a method 
beyond its usual association with common sense and the immediacy of perception. 
Instead Bergson’s intuition reveals a philosophy of immanence, diversity, 
multiplicity and duration, which extends beyond concepts that simply align with our 
conscious states.  
 
Unlike Kant, who had tried to define the conditions for all experience, Bergson 
attempts to discover the conditions of real experience. Bergson’s method of 
intuition is premised upon our emotion of sympathy, which frees us from our 
subjective state by extending our knowledge and experience towards other people 
and things. The method of intuition sides with duration, memory, the élan vital (or 
vital force) and creative emotion, which although unrepresentable in themselves 
are able to assist our articulation and representation of the new as it becomes. This 
method provides the focus for the theoretical and practical discussion in this 
chapter and how intuition and creative emotion are fundamental to the creation and 
production of my artistic practice.  
 
The Method of Intuition stems from Bergson’s investigation of creative evolutionary 
processes. The publication of his text Creative Evolution (1911) led to a growing 
interest in his philosophy, which became highly influential throughout the early 20th 
century for artistic thought, practice, creativity and production. Prominent 
practioners such as Stein, Duchamp and Picasso adopted and experimented with 
Bergson’s creative philosophy. I extend Bergson’s findings beyond the artistic 
mediums and methodologies of his day, by applying them to the new time-based 
mediums of video and audio technology.  
 
The practice work for this chapter consists of two High Definition digital videos and 
a soundtrack that form the Method of Orange. By contemplating one image 
reflected onto perfectly stilled water I sketch out my plan for the work. This 
developed into a method, whereby the original image, continuously changes 
throughout its entire duration, and is also flipped inverted and matched in post-
production. Several variations of the image were combined, creating two videos of 
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continuous change, which simultaneously reveal the inward and outward 
movement of a movement-image. A process that is similar in nature, to Bergson’s 
Method of Intuition. This has assisted my articulation of Bergson’s philosophy and 
how intuition can be understood in a way that is accessible for both the perceiver 
and creator of creative artwork. 
 
 
 
Figure 19. 
 
For Bergson life is inseparable from creation; creativity supports continuity of life 
and the discontinuity of a specifically defined and measurable evolution. He 
critiques a mechanistic view of evolution that ignores life’s continuous change, 
difference and creativity. All teleological approaches to evolution and life require 
finalism, making the creation of anything completely new impossible. Everything 
new, whether experienced internally or externally becomes trapped by a measured 
system. Each individual part of the open whole is then identified by its preceding 
development as if simply waiting for the discovery of its existence.  Mechanism and 
finalism are incapable of revealing complete change as a characteristic of life. So 
Bergson sets out In Creative Evolution to articulate and embrace life’s creative and 
evolutionary diversity through four factors: 1) The élan vital , 2) Tendency theory 
(Divergent Tendencies), 3) The two senses of Intelligence and Intuition and 4) The 
Method of Intuition  
 
1. The élan vital (vital impulse) 
 
When we contemplate life’s entirety we discover beyond any mechanistic division, 
life is a singular, inseparable and unrepeatable action. Life’s telos, implies an 
original and vital principle that is found at its beginning and not at its end. Bergson 
calls this original vital impulse, which is common to the creative evolution of all 
organic things, the élan vital. The élan vital however does not answer how 
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evolutionary diversity occurs and nor does it explain life’s nature. This inspires 
Bergson’s tendency theory, which relates to life’s evolutionary complexity, as well 
as the simplicity of its original vital impulse. As Deleuze explains, 
 
The essence of a tendency is to be developed in the form of a sheaf, 
creating through the sole fact of its growth divergent directions. Élan vital 
would therefore be duration itself to the extent it is actualized, is 
differentiated. Élan vital is difference to the extent that it passes into act. 
Hence differentiation does not come simply from matter's resistance, but 
more profoundly from a force that duration carries in itself: dichotomy is the 
law of life. ….if differentiation is thus the original and irreducible mode 
through which a virtuality is actualized, and if élan vital is duration 
differentiated, then duration itself is virtuality. (2004: 28) 
 
Virtuality for Bergson, is the co-existence of the past and present through memory, 
as the future becomes with the élan vital. 
 
2. Tendency theory (divergent tendencies) 
The vital impulse or élan vital is common to all species, whereas tendency theory 
differentiates the changes in species associated with this creative impulse. This is 
why Bergson identifies two tendencies and distinguishes them through their 
alignment with either qualitative or quantitative multiplicity. Here we encounter the 
successive changes and differentiations of life that can be arranged into opposing 
tendencies such as instinct and intelligence. The differentiation between the two 
tendencies begins with Bergson’s observation of plant, animal and human 
behaviour.  
 
Firstly, he differentiates between plants and animals by way of their mobility 
requirements. Mobility is more necessary for animals on account of their need to 
find food, whereas plants only require photosynthesis to grow and survive. He then 
differentiates between animal and human instinct.  Animal instinct is far more 
refined for survival, whereas humans neglect instinct in favour of their intellectual 
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capacity such as advanced tool making skills (weapons, paint brushes, cameras 
etc.). Bergson takes these ideas a step further by contemplating human life and 
intelligence, not for any speculative function but instead, for their pragmatic 
application to quantitative analysis. Intellectual analysis enhances our knowledge 
and understanding of empirical scientific facts. However, the limits of scientific 
investigation cannot account for our personal experience, Bergson instead 
suggests we follow sympathy, he states, 
 
Instinct is sympathy. If this sympathy could extend to its object and also 
reflect upon itself, it would give us the key to vital operations – just as 
intelligence, developed and disciplined, guides us into matter. For-we cannot 
too often repeat it-intelligence and instinct are turned in opposite directions, 
the former towards inert matter, the latter towards life. Intelligence, by 
means of science, which is its work, will deliver up to us more and more 
completely the secret of physical operations; of life it brings us, and 
moreover only claims to bring us, a translation in terms of inertia. It goes all 
round life, taking from outside the greatest possible number of views of it, 
drawing it into itself instead of entering into it. But it is to the very inwardness 
of life that intuition leads us – by intuition I mean instinct that has become 
disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of 
enlarging it indefinitely. (1998: 176) 
 
3. The two senses of intelligence and intuition 
 
Human intelligence can only achieve true knowledge and the essence of the 
creative vital impulse or élan vital, when following its opposite direction towards the 
qualitative potential of intuition. This combination of the two tendencies of 
intelligence and intuition defines how humans come to absolute knowledge.  
Intelligence relates to space, matter and quantitative analysis, while intuition 
relates to time (durée) and our qualitative experience of our internal states. And as 
such, our unrepresentable internal spiritual states such as memory, creative 
emotion and intuition, survive alongside our perception of our representable body 
and other objects of matter. 
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We are unable to comprehend the essence of life when preoccupied with analytical 
intelligence, however at the edge of intelligence, a fringe of instinct still survives. 
These remnants of instinct offer us a way back to intuition and the essence of life.  
Intelligence and instinct are both part of duration and as such exist alongside the 
original vital impulse. Intuition and intelligence are human tendencies that coincide 
with the élan vital and lead Bergson to turn metaphysics, as Deleuze explains into 
a ‘rigorous discipline’ (Deleuze 2002: 115). Bergson does not speak of intelligence 
and intuition as elite or individualistic states but as tendencies, because then it is 
impossible to separate either away from duration and life’s entirety, as both 
integrate in a continual process of change and becoming.  Intelligence’s concern is 
with objects of matter, while instinct relates to continual change and duration 
‘intelligence and instinct are turned in opposite directions, the former to inert matter 
and the latter towards life’ (Bergson, 1998:176). As Deleuze explains, 
 
Bergson's thesis could be summed up in this way: real time is alteration, and 
alteration is substance. Difference of nature is therefore no longer between 
two things or rather two tendencies; difference of nature is itself a thing, a 
tendency opposed to some other tendency. The decomposition of the 
composite does not just give us two tendencies that differ in nature; it gives 
us difference of nature as one of the two tendencies. And just as difference 
has become a substance, so movement is no longer the characteristic of 
something, but has itself acquired a substantial character. (2004: 37-38) 
 
4) The Method of Intuition 
 
We are able to move from intuition to intelligence by analysis but unable to achieve 
the opposite movement, since intuition is not reducible to analytical data. Intelligent 
and habitual knowledge might be useful for our everyday needs but they are 
obstacles to absolute knowledge. Bergson’s Method of Intuition assists our 
knowledge of life by setting up intelligence against itself. Intuition has too often 
been assumed to lie dormant within ourselves until our vital interests are at risk. 
However, intuition is not an indescribable feeling or lived experience but a method 
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that lies within us. If we leap back into intuition a unity of internal and external life 
emerges. Intuition moves us beyond the external analytical world of intelligence but 
is also able to progress toward intelligent analysis and its practical application in a 
spatially understood dimension. 
 
The philosopher’s job is to grasp and support moments of intuition by opening 
them up to each other to reveal how their process coincides with the human spirit 
and body. Bergson states ‘philosophy introduces us into spiritual life… And at the 
same time, it shows us the relation of the life of spirit to the life of the body’ 
(Bergson, 1998: 268). Philosophy and creativity are our ability to locate and unify 
the diverse and complimentary components found within the differing lines of 
metaphysical and scientific knowledge. Thus spirit and diverse matter are united 
through life’s creativity, which is philosophy, because creativity places us back 
within the creative vital impulse (élan vital) and our philosophical experience. 
Metaphysical and creative thought replenishes absolute knowledge by coinciding 
with absolute becoming. Bergson illuminates how ‘aesthetic intuition, like external 
perception, only attains the individual’ whereas duration relates to everything 
(1998:177). Duration would remain purely intuitive, if Bergson did not have intuition 
as a method. As Deleuze explains, ‘without the methodical thread of intuition, the 
relationships between Duration, Memory and Élan Vital would remain 
indeterminate from the point of view of knowledge’ (Deleuze, 2002:14).  
 
Bergson’s Method of Intuition is a simple act of qualitative and virtual multiplicity, 
with various meanings in which it can be actualised, as Deluze points out,  
 
Intuition as a method is a method that seeks difference. It presents itself as 
seeking and finding differences in nature, the "articulations of the real." 
Being is articulated; a false problem is one that does not respect these 
differences… A difference of nature is never between two products or 
between two things, but in one and the same thing between the two 
tendencies that traverse it, in one and the same product between two 
tendencies that encounter one another in it… Matter and duration are never 
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distinguished as two things but as two movements, two tendencies, like 
relaxation and contraction... As long as we remain within dualism, the thing 
is where two movements meet: duration, which by itself has no degrees, 
encounters matter as a contrary movement, as a certain obstacle, a certain 
impurity that mixes it up, that interrupts its impulse, that gives it such and 
such a degree here, another one over there.  But more profoundly, duration 
is in itself susceptible to degrees because it is that which differs with itself, 
so that every thing is entirely defined in duration, including matter itself 
(Deleuze, 2004: 26-27). 
 
The Method of Intuition as Bergson shows is made from several acts that 
correspond to component parts or degrees of duration (Bergson, 1992: 200). 
Deleuze explains there are three distinct acts that ‘determine the rules of the 
method’ (2002:14). The first act opposes the habit of intelligence and analysis by 
leaping into duration. The second act requires we make the effort to open our own 
duration to continuous heterogeneity. The third act differentiates between the 
extremes of continuous heterogeneity. The three acts ‘determine the rules’ the first 
rule considers ‘the stating and creating of problems’, the second rule the ‘discovery 
of genuine differences in kind’ and the third rule, ‘the apprehension of real time’ 
(Deleuze, 2002:14). 
 
Rule 1: Stating and creating of problems 
 
The method begins by seeking the conditions of problems, asking why they 
mislead us when not properly phrased? The reason as Bergson discovers, is when 
poorly phrased, problems and questions hide the diversity within which they should 
be asked. Usually theories of knowledge claim meaning, rationality and stability as 
the order of things by comparing order to disorder. Bergson however, considers 
order to be contingent with chaos and not in opposition to it and believes we should 
instead compare one order in relation to another (1998:232-233).  
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Usually we ask whether the solution to a problem is true or false, without checking, 
whether the question itself is either of these. Deleuze points out that we need to 
condemn false problems and reconcile truth and creation at the level of the 
problem posed (2002:15). For Bergson, the posing of a problem is a creative act 
and once stated the answer should be implicit within the problem posed. Creation 
and problems function on the same plane and the solution is reliant on the quality 
of the stated problem. Bergson specifies two ways a problem could be found to be 
false: either through its non-existence or because it forms ‘badly analyzed 
composites’ (Deleuze, 2002:17) 
 
The first type of problem finds its root in the second, if we ask why is there 
something rather than nothing we encounter a nonexistent problem. To consider 
nothing to contain less than something, ends up muddling more, less and nothing 
together. A question about nothing can never contain more than a question about 
something because this would require the idea of being, and its negation. 
Something can only be missing if something else takes its place. To ask why there 
is something rather than nothing, results in a non-existent problem. The second 
type of problem arises from being poorly stated because things that are different in 
kind are randomly placed together and analysed under one generalised and 
inappropriate concept.  For example, when mechanistic inorganic matter and 
organic life are compared to each other under a concept of order, without 
acknowledging their individual differences, they appear to contradict each other. 
When order is thought of as disorder, it returns us to the first type of false problem, 
where we contemplate the more or less of things instead of their differences in 
kind. As Deleuze points out,  
 
Conceiving everything in terms of more and less, seeing nothing but 
differences in degree or differences in intensity where, more profoundly, 
there are differences in kind is perhaps the most general error of thought, 
the error common to science and metaphysics. (2002:20) 
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Rule 2: Differences in kind 
This process allows us to phrase the right problem or question, in a way where the 
answer depends on the question posed.  By sympathising with our own situation 
we are able to sympathise with other people and things, which assists our 
identification of the diversity and creativity within which differences in kind exist.  
 
We need to discover true differences in kind that articulate our real experience and 
keep sight of false problems. Differences in kind progress in relation to how their 
composites are mutually joined through extensity and duration, which can be 
defined as directions of movement. Duration in this instant relates to how we 
contract all our qualitative complexities such as sensations, memories, emotions, 
into a whole incapable of being homogenous, juxtaposed and representable 
concepts. Extensity on the other hand, allows for the continuation and expansion of 
matter into an infinite number of homogenous concepts and possibilities. Anything 
found to differ in kind is a tendency with two possible movements or directions into 
which the composite of differences in kind, can divide.  
 
We should question how to move beyond this experience, by finding the conditions 
and differences in kind of the composition. For example, when we consider the 
division between perception/matter/object and memory/dream/creative emotion, we 
discover our experience of them leads us back to their re-combination through our 
duration. When we find a way to express differences in kind relative to their 
particular nature, we move to a composite where differences in kind intersect again 
and produce another new experience within ourselves.  
 
This intersection is always different to its starting point and so becomes a new 
‘virtual point’ within us. This creates a new experience, which is why we need the 
method of intuition, which provides a double movement that moves beyond our 
virtual experience and the differences in kind – transforming dualisms into monism, 
and a new virtual point within us. This process allows us to phrase the right 
problem or question, in a way where the answer depends on the question posed.  
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Rule 3: Apprehension of real time 
 
When we consider duration, instead of endlessly using quantitative analysis within 
space, we experience sympathy within ourselves and others, through the 
communality of duration. Through a common act of the method of intuition, intuition 
is no longer an individual experience but instead accessible to all. The rules of the 
method allow intuition to be ‘the movement by which we emerge beyond our own 
duration, by which we make use of our own duration to affirm and immediately to 
recognize the existence of other durations, above or below us’ (Deleuze, 2002:33). 
The method of intuition presumes the existence of duration because thinking within 
durational terms, offers a dissymmetry between it and space. Duration enables us 
to ‘state problems and solve them in terms of time rather than space’ (Deleuze, 
2002:31). The dichotomy between space and time, for Bergson, is the foundation 
on which all the other divisions such as the Cartesian divide are built. Bergson 
highlights the impact of this split and how, when intuition is no longer considered as 
an individual experience, it is accessible to all through a common act of the method 
of intuition.  
 
This knowledge resides within ourselves and does not necessitate a God or 
mathematics to explain the inexplicable as we mar our understanding with false 
questions such as whether something is more or less, better or worse than 
another. Whereas space is homogenous and can only be understood in relation to 
infinite juxtaposed differences, we can move beyond this measure of things under 
a single concept. And this is where duration’s tendency, to discover qualitative 
differences from itself and differences of kind, can assist our understanding of how 
to create and comprehend, the completely new.  
 
When our general knowledge is built upon comparisons of the more or less, bigger 
or smaller, better or worse of things, we might satisfy a desire for information but 
not our knowledge of things themselves. When notions such as intelligence and 
intuition are conceived in opposition to one another we ignore their unification 
through our lived experience.  Our experience serves to integrate infinite durations 
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and even though we might not know them all, each one comes into existence and 
is related in part to others through duration. Intelligence uses matter to synthesise 
information into general concepts, whereas intuition lets us enter into things 
instead of analysing them from the outside. To achieve absolute knowledge we 
need to sympathise with ourselves, seizing ourselves from within, developing self-
sympathy heterogeneously into our sympathy for others.  
 
Intuition encourages our experience of differences in kind by sympathising with 
ourselves and all other things. In this sense, intuition is sympathy because it allows 
us to step within ourselves and grasp our human experience without the confines 
of reasoning and intelligence. For Bergson,  ‘when one sympathizes with oneself, 
one installs oneself within duration’ (Bergson, 1992:185). Sympathy enables our 
contemplation of immeasurable human psychic states such as consciousness and 
unrepresentable emotion, which frees us from visual and linguistic signs, symbolic 
gestures and scientific and mathematical measurement.  
 
Sympathy transports us ‘into the interior of an object in order to coincide with what 
there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it’ (Bergson,1992 :161). The 
artist, through their effort of intuition as well as their sympathy with the object or 
thing they are creating, can be understood to dismantle the barrier between their 
creative metaphysical self and the space within which they create. The artist is able 
to reveal how metaphysical creativity and the production of something in the 
external world coincide. Mable Dodge provides the following insight into the 
importance of Bergson's method of intuition, for Gertrude Stein's creative 
methodology: 
 
She always works at night in the silence, and brings all her will power to 
bear upon the banishing of preconceived images. Concentrating upon the 
impression she has received and which she wishes to transmit, she 
suspends her selective faculty, waiting for the word or group of words that 
will perfectly interpret her meaning, to rise from her sub-consciousness to 
the surface of her mind. Then and then only does she bring her reason to 
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bear upon them, examining, weighing and gauging their ability to express 
her meaning. It is a working proof of the Bergson theory of intuition. She 
does not go after words--she waits and lets them come to her, and they do. 
It is only when art thus pursues the artist that his production will bear the 
mark of inevitability. It is only when the " élan vital" drives the artist to the 
creative overflow that life surges in his production. Vitality directed into a 
conscious expression is the modern definition of genius. (Mabel Dodge, 
1913, cited in Arts and Decoration March edition) 
 
So how can Bergson’s Method of Intuition be applied beyond Gertrude Stein’s 
writing methodology, to include the creation of art with analogue film, video and 
digital video technology? Andy Warhol was one of the first artists to employ video 
technology within his practice and to experiment with continuous shots, in both film 
and video, over a longer duration. The ability to record a continuous shot over a 
longer time-span has been fundamental to both my practice and theoretical 
research into duration. This is because it allows the unexpected and new to occur 
in my work in ways that I could not have envisaged.  
 
The relationship between a medium and its technical capacity or constraints to 
record image and sound over a longer or shorter time span, has challenged my 
knowledge of moving-image and sound technology. And as a result my practice 
work has assisted my understanding of philosophy and art creation, as well as the 
creative potential of emotion when placed in duration. 
 
Warhol experimented with the capacity of an Auricon 16mm analogue film camera, 
which could contain a 1200ft film reel, to shoot unedited continuous takes of 33-
minute lengths. In 1965 affordable video equipment became available to the 
general public for home entertainment. During the same year Warhol was loaned 
high-end video equipment by Norelco for promotional purposes and asked to report 
his experimental findings. As a result, Warhol produced Outer and Inner Space 
(1965), a 33 minute 16mm film captured with an Auricon camera, which recorded 
Edie Sedgwick watching a previously recorded video image of herself screened on 
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a TV monitor (it also includes a few minutes TV broadcast content). Sedgwick 
appears to be in conversation with her own screened TV image and during the 
exhibition of the work, Warhol projected two versions of the film opposite to each 
other, creating a further layer of Sedgwick's interaction with herself. This technique 
of double projection became a defining technique in Warhol’s projection work and 
can be observed in his well-known film The Chelsea Girls (1966). 
 
 
Figure 20. Stills from Andy Warhol’s Chelsea Girls (1966) 
 
 
One of the problems that Warhol’s Outer and Inner Space highlights is how rapidly 
video technology changes.  The video image seen in his film can now only be 
viewed as 16mm film because the initial slant and scan video format utilized to 
create the video image is no longer available. Warhol’s use of video predates the 
famous video artist Nam June Paik’s first video by a few of months. In October 
1965 Nam June Paik both recorded and exhibited a video on the same day for the 
"Electronic Video Recorder" exhibition. Nam June Paik went on to write a 
manifesto for the electronic age in which he stated ‘just as collage has ousted oil 
painting, so the cathode ray tube will replace the canvas’ (cited in Video Art – 
Martin, 2006: 8). Paik also claimed in the manifesto that,  'Someday artists will 
work with capacitors, resistors, and semiconductors as they work today with 
brushes, violins and junk' (cited By John Hanhardt, Guggenheim Museum, essay 
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excerpt courtesy the Estate of Nam June Paik and John Hanhardt). Paik was 
interested in the relationship between moving painting and sound as the following 
quote reveals,  
 
I feel inferior to painters and inferior to composers. A German who studied 
radar during the war told me radar waves make interesting painting, then I 
had an idea. Why don’t I move from electronic music into electronic painting 
with the TV. I will not compete with the big guys–Jasper Johns and John 
Cage. I will find something new–the moving painting with sound. (Paul 
Gardner, 1992: 67). 
 
 
Figure 21. 
Nam June Paik’s, Electronic Highway 
 
Paik went on to build a video synthesizer that could manipulate both sound and 
image and would also continuously re-record video images to show the gradual 
breakdown of the original image into distorted colour shapes. This same process 
has been applied to re-recorded sound, as the latest version of a continuously re-
recorded sound is projected back into space and re-recorded, until it gradually 
breaks down and distorts.  Alvin Lucier’s sound work I am sitting in a room (1969) 
is based on the re-recording of his voice in a room. By continually repeating this 
process, always replaying and re-recording the latest version of his voice, we hear 
the degradation and breakup of his voice as his speech eventually becomes 
unfathomable to the perceiver of the work. By sympathising with his own plight, as 
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someone that struggles to articulate himself through speech because of a stutter, 
Lucier both comments on his speech difficulties through a medium that best 
expresses his problem, while also creating a completely new artwork. 
 
More recently, Turner Prize winner Douglas Gordon used video technology to 
record, project and manipulate the entirety of Hitchcock's Psycho, to fit the slowed 
down image into 24 hours. Since Gordon's production of 24 Hour Psycho, we have 
seen video technology develop to include Standard Definition digital technology 
and High Definition digital video. However, with each development of the 
technology we find new challenges as more processing power is required and 
older versions of video become defunct. Alexander Sokurov's film Russian Ark 
(2002) challenged the capability of High Definition technology by creating one 
continuously uninterrupted shot that lasts the length of the 90 minute film. To 
process the film the camera needed to be portable and able to deal with vast 
amounts of digital storage and processing power, as well the narrative demands 
and the environments it was required to navigate through. The arrival of compact 
24p High Definition Sony F900 camera ensured both the portability of the camera 
by one camera person using a steadicam, while offering a grater storage capacity. 
As the production notes for the film reveal,  
 
The next challenge was the recording medium. An HD camera can only 
record 46 minutes without changing tapes. We needed 90. A prototype hard 
disk recording system developed by the Cologne company, Director's Friend 
provided the solution. Adapted to be portable and equipped with a special 
ultra-stable battery, this system could record up to 100 minutes of 
uncompressed image - but only once. (cited in Seville Pictures: 2003 
Russian Ark Production notes). 
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The digital technological revolution9, increasingly dominates the way we create, 
produce and manipulate moving-image and sound. And as some would argue 
limits the scope of technological creativity, as it becomes harder to access differing 
mediums such as celluloid film, analogue video and analogue TV technology. 
Increasingly film and image technologies are becoming defunct. Recently it has 
become increasingly difficult to process celluloid film, as 16mmm and 8mm printing 
labs across the world have had to shut down in light of the growing influence, ease 
and affordability of digital technology. However, even though digital technology is 
increasingly used throughout the world, in many instances of commercial film 
production we still find digital film is printed onto 35 mm celluloid film because of 
distribution requirements. As many parts of the world still rely on analogue 
projectors to display film images to cinema audiences. Artists such as Turner prize 
winner Tacita Dean, Becks prize winner Ros Nashishibi and experimental film 
maker Sarah Pucell have continued to admire the aesthetic qualities of analogue 
technologies and the medium of film. This way of film making however, is 
increasingly difficult to sustain as digital processing dominates the world market. 
Dean has expressed her concern for the continued depletion of film stocks and 
processing labs, which has threatened her preference for 16mm film production, a 
medium that she feels links closely to painting.  
 
My films are depictions of their subject and therefore closer to painting than 
they are to narrative cinema....working as both artist and artisan. It is the 
heart of my process, and the way I form the film is intrinsically bound up with 
these solitary hours of watching, spooling and splicing...…My relationship to 
film begins at that moment of shooting, and ends in the moment of 
projection. Along the way, there are several stages of magical 
transformation that imbue the work with varying layers of intensity. This is 
why the film image is different from the digital image: it is not only emulsion 
versus pixels, or light versus electronics but something deeper – something 
to do with poetry. (Dean cited in Save celluloid, for art's sake: Higgins, The 
guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 22 February 2011) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See appendix 6 for brief explanation of digital technology. 
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Figure 22. 
Tacita Dean: ‘Film’ in Tate Modern, London 
  
 
However, Dean does not want to limit her practice to analogue film alone, she 
simply wants to speak of her loss of another technology, which is different in kind. 
Dean claims she is not ‘fetishising’ the medium and nor is she ‘anti-digital’, she 
simply wants the option to utilise both meduims (quoted in Save celluloid, for art's 
sake: Higgins, The guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 22 February 2011). As Dean states, 
 
Smaller formats of celluloid film have become increasingly difficult to access 
as analogue film processing, focuses on 35mm film technology, a decision 
driven by economics and distribution...Many of us are exhausted from 
grieving over the dismantling of analogue technologies. Digital is not better 
than analogue, but different. What we are asking for is co-existence: that 
analogue film might be allowed to remain an option for those who want it, 
and for the ascendency of one not to have to mean the extinguishing of 
the other. (cited in Save celluloid, for art's sake: Higgins, The 
guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 22 February 2011) 
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Nashshibi has also recently turned to digital film production, as similar to Dean, she 
finds it increasingly difficult to access and process film – as a result she has 
embraced digital technology as a new experiment.  
 
 
 
Figure 23. Ros Nashashibi’s, Happenings 
 
 
The age of digital technology is ever more variable and artists are increasingly 
embracing a hybridity of analogue film, TV, analogue video, digital technologies 
and production techniques. Hockney now paints with digital technology, as he 
records the durational change of landscape with multiple digital video cameras and 
a variety of digital technology. 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Still from David Hockney video installation 
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Char Davies began as a painter and filmmaker before encountering digital 
software, which prompted her exploration of immersive virtual environments. 
Davies created Osmose 1995 as an immersive interactive virtual environment that 
is perceived with a head-mounted display, which the viewer navigates through 
using their own balance and breathing.  The observed computer-generated image 
is constructed to appear as if in a 3-dimensional world and challenges our 
conscious perception of ourselves. The accompanying sound is designed to allow 
audience interaction and changes according to the perceiver’s environment, 
navigation and speed of motion. To this end Davies questions the divisions of the 
Cartisian divide. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25. Char Davies’s, Osmose  
 
 
 
Artists such as Davies and Natalie Jeremijenko have grasped the technological 
enhancements of digital technology to create immersive and socio-political 
experiences that challenge our perception of the mind/body split and dominant 
ideologies. These artists continue to develop alternative perceptions and 
interactions to our everyday experience and use a hybridity of digital and analogue 
technologies, to assist their creation of sound and moving-image. 
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Figure 26. Natalie Jermijenko’s, The Cathedral of Light (2012) 
 
 
If I now reconsider how to question and determine the usefulness of either 
analogue or digital technology for the purpose of light and image creation in 
duration. I can begin by applying the acts and rules of Bergson’s Method of 
Intuition to the ongoing debate about which technology, digital or analogue, is the 
better or worse for moving-image creation? I start by sympathising with the variety 
of film and video making technologies and remind myself of the élan vital. This vital 
impulse or in this instance the technological medium’s élan vital, I construe as its 
ability to record and display light. This technological élan vital becomes in duration 
with light, using chemistry (e.g. celluloid film/chemical processing) or electricity 
(video/ TV/digital video processing), as well through a combination of both (as in 
Warhol’s projected images or the work of artists such as Davies and Dean). 
 
I then determine the differences in kind relevant to both digital and analogue 
technology, which splits their tendencies into quantitative and qualitative 
multiplicities. Thus dividing their movement either towards their quantitative 
analysis in space or their qualitative becoming in duration. In one, the quantitative 
and representable, I can calculate light and technology with retrospective 
mathematics, chemical symbols and light particles and waves. While in the other, 
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the qualitative and unrepresentable, chemistry, electricity and light are themselves 
becoming in duration. Thus we discover two tendencies, one that measures 
technological attributes to sample and process light in space, while the other is 
their ability to capture and display light becoming. As a result, I move beyond their 
measurement as film grains or digital video pixels to reconsider their attributes, not 
for their better or worse, but instead for their potential to assist art creation with 
light. 
 
This extends my analysis equating technological functionality with the symbolic 
representation of mathematics in space, to engage with their individual potentials 
through the lens of their élan vital. This vital impulse is their ability to capture and 
display light for the benefit of our perception with light, which enables our creation 
of something new with light sensation, using either or both technologies to express 
creative emotion in the material world. If we consider our observation of images, 
we find the initial and final result of our observation of all movement-images is a 
simple function of our perception of real light in the material world over duration. 
The simple act of vision, as Bergson reminds us, requires the indefinable 
sophisticated function of the eye, 
 
The mechanism of the eye is, in short, composed of an infinity of 
mechanisms, all of extreme complexity. Yet vision is one simple fact. As 
soon as the eye opens, the visual act is effected. Just because the act is 
simple, the slightest negligence on the part of nature in the building of the 
infinitely complex machine would have made vision impossible. This 
contrast between the complexity of the organ and the unity of the function is 
what gives us pause. (Bergson,1998: 88) 
 
 
Ultimately, we are simply using the functioning of the eye and our observation of 
light to appreciate the production and creation of something new with light. Artists 
such as James Turrel and Antony McCall provide artistic evidence of this, as their 
work is premised upon the duration of light itself. 
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Figure 27. James Turell’s, Afrum I (White) 	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Anthony McCall’s Room with Altered Window   	  
 
Our observation of images of light, whether created with digital or analogue 
technology is our observation of light itself within the duration of the whole, which is 
light becoming. Bergson elucidates how, 
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It is the picture, i.e. the simple act, projected on the canvas, which, by the 
mere fact of entering into our perception, is decomposed before our eyes 
into thousands and thousands of little squares which present, as composed, 
a wonderful arrangement. So the eye, with its marvellous complexity of 
structure, may be only the simple act of vision, divided for us into a mosaic 
of cells, whose order seems marvellous to us because we have conceived 
the whole as an assemblage. (1998:90) 
 
A question about creativity with light proves that a question about differences of 
technology and which is better or worse, whether analogue or digital, is too 
simplistic. This is because it neglects what is being created and why it is being 
created with light in duration, and the vital force and creative emotion that drives us 
to do so. When we observe moving-images or listen to sound we rely on the 
qualitative functioning of our sight and hearing and our ability to perceive sound 
and light sensation. A preference for either analogue or digital or the combination 
of both technologies, only becomes relevant when the artist specifically needs to 
express something in particular with a specific medium for a specific reason. This 
has led to my experimentation with analogue film, digital video and analogue and 
digital sound.  
 
The practice work for this chapter began with the creation of the sound piece, 
Moments in a Journey of Speech, which contemplates the movement of 
unrepresentable emotion and a pre-linguistic journey of the voice. It alludes to the 
movement and potential of unrepresentable creative emotion, while contemplating the 
internal Moments of a Journey of Speech, prior to its expression as vocals in the 
material world. To achieve this, I recorded my voice and digitally manipulated the 
sound to distort language into sonic noise. The resulting sound was assigned to 
specified speakers to create spatial movement. The soundtrack pans back and 
forth between stereo speakers and was designed to travel from one end of a 
corridor like space to the other. At moments selected sounds bounce back and 
forth between speakers, while overall the track continues its graduation towards 
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the opposite end of the space. The thing about sound, as with light, is we forget 
they are not linear but a radiation outwards in all directions.  
 
The soundtrack was then accompanied by a 1:30 minute panning shot using 8mm 
film (see figure 29. below for stills from the film). It focuses on a section of the most 
intense colour of sky at sunset, while silhouetted against this light are the shapes of 
the blackening landscape.  The visual piece reflects upon my research into the 
representation of neuroimaging techniques and the mapping of emotion and 
audiovisual areas within the brain.  
 
 
Figure 29. Stills from Moments in a Journey of Speech 
 
The audiovisual piece Moments in a Journey of Speech led to the development of 
the practice work The Method of Orange.  
 
This audiovisual work consists of two new HD video pieces that relate to Bergson’s 
theoretical discussion of the Method of Intuition. The soundtrack created for 
Moments in a Journey of Speech was looped and edited together with the two new 
HD videos, to portray the outwards and inwards movement of the Method of 
Orange. 
 
The way we perceive light and colour as an altering image, whether: fluctuating 
light graduating to an image becoming (In my Breath I Drew), moving from external 
light and landscape into an internal room (Portrait of Myself) or light shifting 
towards darkness (The Method of Orange) has influenced my entire PhD practice.  
Deleuze considers how, 
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Between light and darkness, between colors, between nuances, difference 
is absolute. The passage from one to the other is itself also an absolutely 
real phenomenon. We therefore grasp duration and élan vital, the virtual and 
its actualization, as two extremes. Still, it must be said that duration is 
already élan vital because it is the essence of the virtual to be actualized; 
we therefore require a third aspect that shows it to us, one in some way 
intermediary to the two preceding. It is precisely under this third aspect that 
duration is called memory. Through all of its characteristics, duration is 
indeed a memory because it prolongs the past in the present, "whether the 
present distinctly encloses the ever-growing image of the past or whether it 
rather bears witness, through its continual changing of quality, of the ever-
weightier burden one leads behind oneself as one grows older. (2004: 28) 
 
I have watched subtle and sudden change of light throughout summer, spring, 
autumn and winter. Figure 30. below, shows three stills from Hour Between Light 
and Dark, a video I captured showing the progression of day into night over the 
duration of one hour. As the exterior light fades, the interior light becomes 
increasingly more reflective on the interior windowpane, creating the effect of 
moving from exterior to interior. The audio accompanying the work is the sound of 
the television programme, which is also visually reflected in the interior 
windowpane. This practice research influenced my experimental text/vocal piece, 
The things I have to go under - A Short Film to be read aloud (see Appendix 7). It 
also informed ideas for the Representing Refugees exhibition.  
 
 
Figure 30. Stills from Hour between light and dark 
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The way analogue and digital technologies record and display the effects of 
changing light meant extensive testing of exposure settings and different camera 
types. For this section, my final choice of technology was a HD camera, as I 
wanted to gain a better understanding of HD technology and the challenge of 
processing vast amounts of digtal video data, during both the production and post-
production stages.  I needed to understand when recording light over duration, how 
long the HD digital capture card/s (4 x P2 cards) could run for and how long the 
data would take to process, render and compress?  I began to test post-production 
techniques with High Definition video as the increased image definition required a 
vast amount of time to process on a home computer. This led to fairly challenging 
post-production testing and techniques, in order to retain as much of the quality of 
the original High Definition image, as possible. A substantial amount of testing was 
required to ensure the compression of the image did not affect or degrade the 
colour of the image too severely.  This was to ensure an acceptable file size could 
be achieved to fit the image onto a playable storage medium for display and 
exhibition purposes. However, as I reach the end of this research it has become 
increasingly frustrating to find it is still difficult to produce something of the same 
standard as the originally captured HD video data that fits to an accessible storage 
medium and player.  
 
The final HD video was shot in England in mid-summer on the Norfolk coast near 
Salthouse. Initially, I spent a couple of afternoons driving along a stretch of coast, 
watching a calm sea as light reflected from its surface and began to fade towards a 
darkening summer sky.  On the third evening I looked up towards the brightest part 
of the sky, perceiving the change of sunlight as it painted colour onto gradually 
drifting clouds. I set the camera up turning it towards the brightest part of the sky. 
Intuitively framing, focusing, resetting settings, switching buttons, zooming the lens 
into a shot that framed the most vibrant and well-lit section of sky. Light streamed 
through the lens projecting onto a focal plane, where photoactive sensors captured 
its essence. Unseen, digital technology selected and measured samples of 
continuous real world light, breaking it down into imperceptible intervals as the 
capturing device momentarily, switched on and off.  
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The HD video camera recorded a single shot of the changing colour and the 
movement of clouds at sunset. The cameras storage medium (P2 card) retained 
digital information equivalent to a continuous shot of 16 minutes, as the movement 
of light and its differentiation, faded towards dark. The recorded and projected 
images, similar to our own sense-perception of external things in the material 
world, will never contain the depth, density or complexity, of the actual light and 
cloud formation, however, when screened again, the light will be renewed light 
becoming.  
 
Sympathising with the image, I knew this was the movement of creative emotion, 
as the sky clearly revealed change, differentiation and the becoming of duration. 
For Bergson, the unrolling of duration is similar to a unity of movement that 
progresses like a multiplicity of states, spreading across a colour-spectrum. 
Intuition, he points out, is of duration and if we imagine no other colour but orange, 
symphathising and entering into it, we would find ourselves ‘caught between red 
and yellow’ (Bergson,1992: 187). Perceiving a variety of shades from dark orange 
to red, and from light orange to yellow as we sense the whole colour spectrum that 
exists beneath and above the colour orange.  Lawlor and Moulard, paraphrasing 
Bergson, state, 
 
I may introspect and sympathize with my own duration: my duration may be 
the only one. But if I make an effort, I sense in my duration a variety of 
shades. In other words, the intuition of duration puts me in contact with a 
whole continuity of durations, which I could, with effort, try to follow upwardly 
or downwardly, upward to spirit or downward to inert matter. (The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2012) 
 
Driving home I contemplated the image and its mirrored moving-image, as if 
reflected from a surface of water. This led to the initial moving-image being 
replicated in postproduction to create four separate versions, each of which when 
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synced up and pasted back together, consecutively mirrored and matched its 
opposing reflected image. Deleuze points out that, 
 
there will not be in Bergson's work anything like a distinction between two 
worlds, one sensible, the other intelligible, but only two movements, or even 
just two directions of one and the same movement: the one is such that the 
movement tends to congeal in its product, in its result, that which interrupts 
it; and the other turns back and retraces its steps, rediscovers in the product 
the movement from which it resulted. The two directions are natural as well, 
each in its own way: the former occurs according to nature, though nature 
risks losing itself in it at each pause, at each breath; the latter occurs 
contrary to nature, but nature rediscovers itself in it, starts over again in the 
tension. The latter can only be found beneath the former, and it is always 
thus that it is rediscovered. (2004: 23-24) 
 
My final composition for The Method of Orange formed two new video images, one 
that seamlessly integrates four moving-images so they appear to move 
continuously outwards.  I then rearranged the same four moving-images, beginning 
with the reflected image first and utilising the same method as set out above. This 
created another digital moving image, which continuously moves inwards. Through 
this method of reflecting and mirroring the originally recorded image, two new video 
projections were created. The two images clearly reveal two movements, one that 
moves away from its centre, towards its representation in space, while the other 
folds back into itself, as it moves inwards towards its unrepresentable interior.  As 
Deleuze discusses, 
 
For the time-image to be born…the actual image must enter into relation 
with its own virtual image as such; from the outset pure description must 
divide in two, ‘repeat itself, take itself up again, fork, contradict itself’. An 
image which is double-sided, mutual, both actual and virtual, must be 
constituted. We are no longer in the situation of a relationship between the 
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actual image and other images, recollections, or dreams, which thus 
become actual in turn: this is still a mode of linkage. We are in the situation 
of an actual image and its own virtual image, to the extent that there is no 
longer any linkage of the real with the imaginary, but indiscernibility of the 
two, a perpetual exchange. (1994: 273) 
 
In The Method of Orange, one video image contracts back into itself as if absorbing 
the external representable world through intelligent analysis. The other video 
image reveals the internal unrepresentable world of intuition, which continuously 
emerges and creates itself, with creative emotion in the external world. The images 
below show stilled frames from both the outward and inwards method, utilized to 
create The Method of Orange. 
 
Outwards Method 
 
The original image (a) below can be observed alongside its mirrored image to its 
right. Both were combined in the top half of the video-editing screen. These same 
two images were then mirrored again replicating their reflected images below in the 
bottom half of the screen. The resultant image matches all four images together to 
reveal one shot that moves continuously outwards. Over duration, the entire 
moving image travels outwards as the video projection progresses towards fading 
light. 
a. Original image                  Image mirrored to right                                   Final Image 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image mirrored from below      Mirrored to right and from below  
 
Figure 31 
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Inwards Method 
 
When the same process of mirroring and reflection (as discussed above) is 
repeated starting with the mirrored image first, we experience a second image that 
can be observed continuously moving inwards as the light fades.  
 
Mirrored image                   Mirrored again to right                               Final Image 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  
Mirrored again below         Mirrored again from below and right 
Figure 32. 
 
Both images should be projected within a space that would allow the perceiver of 
the work, to observe them simultaneously and experience the movement of the 
soundtrack between speakers located in the same environment. In this way, the 
perceiver of the work would be able to encounter two visual analogies to Bergson’s 
Method of Intuition that reveal our creative journey, between our unrepresentable 
internal intuition, and its suggestion through the creation of video moving- images 
in the external world.  
 
In short, actually divergent series give birth to, in duration, coexistent virtual 
degrees. Between intelligence and instinct there is a difference of nature 
because they arise from two divergent series; but what does this difference 
of nature finally express if not two degrees that coexist in duration, two 
different degrees of relaxation or of contraction?...Because if everything 
[tout] is not given, it remains that the virtual is the whole [le tout]. Let us 
recall that the élan vital is finite: the whole is what is realized in species, 
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which are not in its image any more than they are the image of one another. 
…..If the past coexists with itself as present, if the present is the most 
contracted degree of the coexistent past, then this same present, because it 
is the precise point at which the past is cast toward the future, is defined as 
that which changes nature, the always new, the eternity of life.  (Deleuze, 
2004: 30) 
 
Dean discuses the importance of artists displaying their work for exhibition and 
how a restriction of technology affects the presentation of their work, especially 
when attempting to display something that moves beyond the importance of 
narrative structure. For Dean, 
 
artists exhibit, and so care about the final presentation and presence of the 
artwork in the space. Other professions have their work mediated into 
different formats: TV, magazines, billboards, books. It remains only in 
galleries and museums that the physical encounter is so critical, (cited in 
Save celluloid, for art's sake: Higgins, The guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 22 
February 2011). 
 
Thus to exhibit the two video images created for The Method of Orange within an 
environment that is conducive to their specific installation requirements, would 
enhance their meaning and potential.  
 
Installation of The Method of Orange: 
 
Images: Two looped projections:  
The original H.D. image was 16 minutes long but to assist the viewer’s experience 
of the subtle change of the image it has been slightly speeded up to fit to 11 
minutes. The original image was then copied and manipulated to create two 
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separate moving images 1] Outwards: reveals movement towards its external 
frame and 2] Inwards: reveals movement towards its centre. 
 
Sound: Looped audiotrack Moments in a Journey of Speech. 
The Sound would be played in stereo through 2 left speakers assigned to 1] 
Outwards projection and 2 right speakers assigned to 2] Inwards projection. This 
would enable the perceiver of the work to experience the spatial movement of the 
sound between left and right speakers and the moments were sound bounces back 
and forth between the two. For an alternative to this soundtrack, listen to D. 
Payling’s soundpiece, which he created for The Method of Orange, as part of the 
practice submission for his PhD 10. 	  
1] Outwards image with 2 x left Speakers – the sound would travel away from 
these speakers. 
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2] Inwards image with 2 x right Speakers – the sound would travel towards these 
speakers. 
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Fig 33. Stills from Method of Orange 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Dave Payling: (see/listen to Sunset Refex/Sunset Soundtrack, Time Dilation and the Sky)  https://davepayl.wordpress.com/category/video-­‐music/	  
https://davepayl.wordpress.com/2011/01/19/sunset-soundtrack-time-dilation-and-the-sky/ http://soundcloud.com/dave-­‐payling/sunset-­‐reflex	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finally, he shows us that if degrees coexist in duration, duration is at each instant 
that which is differentiated, that it is differentiated into past and present, or, if you 
prefer, that the present is doubled in two directions, one toward the past, the other 
toward the future. These three times correspond, in the whole of the work, to the 
notions of duration, memory, and élan vital. (Deleuze, 2004: 31) 
 
 
Figure 34. Gilles Deleuze 
 
FIN 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Henri Bergson identified two types of emotion, firstly those that are 
representational and secondly those that are pure and unrepresentable. The 
unrepresentable characteristics of emotion function throughout a fluid duration as 
its complex nature ceaselessly changes into new psychic states. It is this 
unrepresentable emotion that I have investigated, in relation to Bergsonian 
duration and creative emotion.  
 
In this dissertation, I argued that Deleuze’s cinematic concept, the movement-
image, not simply because of its representation of content but also due its 
continual process of change over the duration of its screening, can assist our 
understanding of emotion’s changing nature. Film, like music, requires our 
experience of the entire duration of its becoming as a specific video, film or sound 
work, in order to comprehend its meaning or essence. The fundamental 
characteristic of mediums such as sound and video images are their progression 
through movement and change over time, otherwise, we would be unable to make 
sense of them as time-based mediums.  
 
The similarities between the motion of film, video, light and emotion are not only 
their observable characteristics and signs of movement in space, but their 
continual becoming as an act of creative emotion over duration. It is this potential 
to change over duration and time instead of simply revealing a change of position 
in space that I have used to show, using mainly Bergsonian and Deleuzian 
philosophy, that unrepresentable emotion like moving-images continues to change 
and create the new. To show how our experience of internal and external duration 
can fuel our creative potential and relate creativity to my digital video and sound 
production work.  
 
This observation has also informed my research into unrepresentable emotion and 
its movement and creative potential in relation to time-based art production in our 
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digital era. Increasingly, especially in the Western World, we live, work, 
communicate and create with computers and digitally enhanced multimedia. We 
build computerised mathematical systems or geometric models to assist our 
representation and understanding of both our external and internal worlds. 
Advanced digital imaging maps our brain and internal body’s geographical regions, 
usually providing stilled images of internal human activity. Often though, our 
analysis of emotion, the brain and search for the mind lack mention of the 
relevance of movement and continual change for our questioning or understanding 
of these concepts.  
 
We have entered an age whereby binary systems and mathematics are held ever 
more in high esteem, At times our passion for everything digital, makes it hard to 
believe that mathematics is not a material object.  Our rationalization of the world 
often leads us to forget that mathematics and geometry are abstract symbolic 
concepts that represent and evidence human creativity. We should remember that 
digital does not exist as a material object, it is instead a human representation of 
an abstract idea, based on the functioning of analogue ideas that are now linked to 
the digitization of electrical volts. Electricity has transformed our access, capture, 
storage and output of data for human perception and understanding. It is important, 
though in an age of time-based production works, that we remain aware of their 
foundations and the relevance of movement to their functioning and our experience 
of emotion and creativity.  
 
Deleuze, allows us to understand, and I believe the images I have submitted for 
this PhD more clearly show, film (digital video and all moving image) is an image of 
a section of its own duration becoming, which is within the whole of duration as it 
becomes. It is not that narrative film is worse or better than experimental film or 
analogue is better than digital.  Instead film's nature, similar to the nature of 
creative emotion, is a creative force becoming. Bergson states, 
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It is the emotion which drives the intelligence forward inspite of obstacles. It 
is the emotion above all which verifies, or rather vitalizes, the intellectual 
elements with which it is destined to unite, constantly collecting everything 
that can be worked in with them and finally compelling the enunciation of the 
problem to expand into its solution. And what about literature and art? A 
work of a genius is in most cases the outcome of an emotion, unique of its 
kind, which seemed to baffle expression and yet which had to express itself. 
(Bergson, Two Sources of Morality and Religion, 2002:46) 
 
Throughout this research I have mentioned artists of genius compelled to create, 
not to be judged as better or worse, but because a creative force flows through 
them that dares to be expressed, in the material world. Sound, light and matter-flux 
are created as moving things becoming, which an audience continues to change, 
long after they have looked away and left the art space.  As Deleuze writes,   
 
It is the genesis of intuition in intelligence. If man accedes to the open 
creative totality, it is therefore by acting, by creating rather than 
contemplating … In philosophy itself, there is still too much alleged 
contemplation: Everything happens as if intelligence were already imbued 
with emotion, thus with intuition, but not sufficiently so for creating in 
conformity to this emotion. (Deleuze, 2002: 111-112)  
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Appendix 1: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35. 
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Figure 36. 
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Figure 37. 
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Appendix 2:
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Appendix 3: 
 
During the viewing of the work - to be recited aloud, read silently to oneself 
or ignored, to allow focus on the image and the ambient sound.  
 
In my breath I drew 
For words rubbed out on lips 
And so in drifting through 
Touched the drums of ears 
There they marked a beat 
Remembering a pace  
I turned to breathe again 
Reaching out for space 
 
I found the breaking sound 
It broke the back of barriers 
In flying it had found 
Finding darkened rooms 
Reaching the speed of light  
Painting it cast its spell 
Flew into its flight  
And so before you fell 
 
For a light that begins to fall 
Falling begins to paint, 
Painting the speed of blue, 
Blue that begins to recede 
Receding it spills the red 
Red that begins to proceed 
Proceeding becomes an expanse 
Expanding away from me 
 
I turn to face the dark 
Its sound so deep inside 
Remembering to say 
In my breath I drew. 
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Appendix 4: 
Damasio 
 
Antonio Damasio is a Professor of Neuroscience, Neurology and Psychology and 
explores the relationship between the mind and brain and the relevance of emotion 
to rational thought. His book Descartes Error reveals how Descartes claim ‘I think, 
therefore I am’ excludes how fundamental human emotions are to our existence. 
Damasio’s research questions our understanding of the function of our organs, 
neurons, cells, nervous system and brain, which have been represented by the 
latest neuroimaging and bodyimaging technologies within the body landscape. 
However, Damasio acknowledges that Neuroscience and Psychology have 
focused their ideas and research on the brain and cognition, which is to the 
detriment of emotion. He argues that emotions assist social behaviour and 
communication as well as rational thought. 
 
Damasio was influenced William James’s doctrine of Radical Empiricism, which 
challenged Kant’s divisions of subjective and objective knowledge and rejected the 
domination of sense data. James’s doctrine revealed how ordinary empiricism’s 
notion of experience, splits ‘knowledge from emotional investment in the 
procedures one has to follow’ (Meyer, 2003: 11). Instead, in relation to our 
experience as human beings, James stressed the importance of process and 
procedures and conjunctive and disjunctive relations.  
 
 Bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that 
our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion (James, 1884: 
188-205). 
 
Emotions in this instance are the perception of bodily responses to a unique 
physiological response, which results in different feelings such as sadness or 
anger. James’s definition of emotion though, has been accused by philosophers 
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like Wittgenstein, of appearing to be closer to a definition of sensation. Also Walter 
Cannon, who studied ‘emergency reactions’ like fear and pain found the autonomic 
nervous system was often activated prior to an emotional response, in anticipation 
of action rather than as a reaction and that certain physiological states can affect 
more than one emotional response.   
 
Damasio distinguishes between feelings and emotion, claiming that emotions are 
specific bodily reactions to mental states. Feeling on the other hand, requires 
combined perception of a causative object, a subsequent emotional state, followed 
by the related thought. Damasio believes ‘pre-feeling’ emotion can arise from 
bodily feedback, or simulated feedback in the brain’s somatosensory maps.  He 
claims that the ‘mind results from operation of each of the separate component, 
and from the concerted operation of the multiple systems constituted by those 
separate components’ (2006:15).  
 
The anatomical structures involved in this concerted operation consist of organs 
and brain regions that have specialized functions that interact For example: Broca's 
and Wernicke's areas for language, the hippocampus for episodic memory, and the 
amygdala for fear memory. In commenting on ventromedial prefrontal cortices and 
amygdala, Damasio states,  
 
there appears to be a collection of systems in the human brain consistently 
dedicated to the goal-oriented thinking processes we call reasoning, and to 
the response selection we call decision making, with a special emphasis on 
the personal and social domains. This same collection of systems is also 
involved in emotion and feeling, and is partly dedicated to processing body 
signals (Damasio, 2006:70). 
 
Although Damasio makes a distinction between the brain and body, he in fact 
believes they function as the organism, as a whole. He associates the brain with 
the nervous system and the body as an organ without neural tissue (Damasio, 
2006: 86). Brain and body communicate both ways through nerve and chemical 
activity, 
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 The brain receives signals not only from the body, but, in some of its 
sectors, from parts of itself that receive signals from the body! The organism 
constituted by the brain-body partnership interacts with the environment as 
an ensemble, the interaction being of neither the body nor the brain alone. 
But complex organisms such as ours do more than just interact, more than 
merely generate the spontaneous or reactive external responses known 
collectively as behaviour. They also generate internal responses, some of 
which constitute images (visual, auditory, somatosensory, and so on), which 
I postulate as the basis for the mind (Damasio, 2006: 88). 
 
Damasio develops his theory of ‘Mind’ as an internal image display, rooted in brain-
body-world interaction. He believes we perceive things, not images and we should 
not confuse perception, which occurs in an organism at a personal level, with 
neural activity that happens at the subpersonal level. Bergson and Deleuze have 
similar points of view in relation to perception, representation, memory and the 
virtual. Memory for Damasio, whether image storage or recall, has the capacity to 
recall by re-activating firing patterns in sensory cortices, which are controlled by 
‘potential patterns of neuron activity’ or ‘a dormant firing potentiality’ (Damasio, 
2006:102-103). These dispositions are found in other parts of the brain to those 
discovered in the sensory cortices, highlighting the difference between firing 
patterns in memory and those located in the sensory cortices.  
 
Damasio connects ‘knowledge’ to dispositional representations that are innate and 
developed in the hypothalamus, brain stem, and limbic system. When a new born 
child needs to know how to breath, regulate temperature and suckle, this acquired 
knowledge is constructed out of representations formed in the subcortial nuclei and 
higher-order cortices. Which suggests that thought is formed from images. For 
Damasio, images include perceptual and recall images: Perceptual images relate 
to things such as music, landscape, touch, sight and movement, which are  
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perceived as various sensations. Recall images, refer to ‘shapes, colours, 
movements, tones, or spoken or unspoken words. Those images, which occur as 
you conjure up a remembrance of things past’ (Damasio, 2006:96). 
 
Although we develop species-typical structures, Damasio believes that nature is 
open to nurture and our lower brain areas constantly interact with higher brain 
systems. The actions we plan are constructed in our higher brain and these are 
‘evaluated and shaped by a fundamental set of preferences of the organism that 
consider survival paramount’ (Damasio, 2006:111). The lower brain stores these 
preferences, which it signals to the upper brain via an emotional valuation system.  
 
According to Damasio, Descartes’ error lies in his overestimation of reason and not 
the dualism of humans and rationality, as opposed to animal instincts and emotion 
(Damasio, 2006:124- 126). However, as Damasio himself points out, as organisms 
we experience a continuously changing succession of states that during analysis, 
we perceive as a snapshot of our underlying processes. These frozen moving-
images or snapshots, for Damasio, are images of artificial states that consist of 
‘discrete units’ or ‘merge continuously’. These images though, offer a mere, 
 
momentary slice of life, indicating what was going on in the various organs 
of a vast organism during the time window defined by the camera’s shutter 
speed. (In reality things are a bit more complicated than this) (Damasio 
2006:87). 
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Appendix  5: 
 
The brain has been mapped and divided into areas such as the brain stem 
(connected to the spinal cord and central nervous system), the cerebral cortex 
(made from neurons and considered to be for complex functions like thinking and 
speaking), the left and right hemispheres and sensory and motor areas The brains 
emotional responses are often confined to areas that have been designated to 
lower brain regions, which stem from and connect to primordial and primitive parts. 
These regions are linked to and located near the spinal cord and the nervous 
system, which are defined as parts of the motor active system and the instinctive, 
impulsive and emotionally charged body.  
 
Below is a brief outline of a few neurological distinctions of brain areas. (Figure 40. 
shows numbered brain areas and a brief description of their function). 
 
Motor-sensory: 
 
 
 
Figure 38. Motor-sensory areas of the brain: 
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Sensory Areas Include: Primary Somesthetic area (diagram no.1, 2+3): receives 
sensations from visceral and muscular receptors located throughout the body. Its 
main function is to locate where the bodies sensations originate. Secondary 
somesthetic area: connected with less specific aspects of sensation. Somesthetic 
association area (diagram no.5+7): receives input from lower brain sections such 
as the thalamus and primary somesthetic area. Decodes and Integrates felt 
sensations, without visual influence, which enable shape and texture identification 
of objects to orientate one object to another and sense relationship between the 
two. Although, memory storage within the brain is disputed by Bergson, this area 
has been linked to the storage of memories from previous sensory experiences for 
comparative purposes. 
  
Other sensory areas include: Primary visual area (diagram no.17): receives 
sensory impulses from eyes and translates movement, form and colour. Visual 
association area (diagram no.18+19): receives signals from thalamus and primary 
visual area that relate ‘present to past visual experiences with recognition and 
evaluation of what is seen’ (Tortora, Anagnostakos, 1987: 322). Primary auditory 
area (diagram no. 41+42): interprets basic characteristics of sound such as pitch 
and rhythm. Anterolateral section responds to low pitch sounds and the 
posterolateral section to high pitch sounds. The Auditory Association area (diagram 
no. 22) verifies whether audio is sonic noise, speech or music and analyses 
speech meaning, by translating it into thought. Primary gustatory area (diagram no. 
43): interprets sensation of taste. Primary olfactory (): interprets sensation of smell. 
Gnostic: among somesthetic areas and visual and auditory association areas, this 
receives impulses from these areas and lower brain stem, the thalamus and areas 
of taste and smell. Combines sensory interpretations from associated and other 
area impulses to form thought from sensory inputs. Transmits signals to other parts 
of the brain to assist appropriate responses to sensory input.  
 
Motor Areas Include: The Primary motor area (diagram no. 4) controls muscles 
and muscle groups. Stimulation of the area leads to muscle contraction on the 
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opposing side of body. The Premotor area (diagram no.6) relates to complex, 
sequential and learned motor activities. It produces impulses that cause specified 
muscles to contract in sequence (e.g. during skilled activities such as writing). The 
Frontal area (eye field) - (Fig 39. Diagram area no.8): controls eye movements as 
when seeking a word in a document. 
 
Language area (Fig 39. Diagram area no. 44): is usually located in left cerebral 
hemisphere of the brain and involves the integration of two distinct potentials, one 
is expression and our ability to speak and the other is comprehension. The Broca’s 
area is responsible for speaking in association with the motor area controlling 
muscles for articulation. The Wernicke’s area is for language comprehension and 
understanding written and spoken language. These areas also help us to translate 
speech and written words into thoughts.  
 
 
Figure 39. Language areas: Broca’s and Wernicke’s area 
http://web.uvic.ca/~lalonde/psyc335/notes/lecture08.html [Accessed 25-05-2013] 
 
The sensory areas included in this process are:  primary auditory, auditory 
association, primary visual, visual association, and Gnostic. To translate thought 
into speech requires the motor control of the Broca’s area. Signals are sent to 
premotor regions that control muscles in the larynx, pharynx and mouth.  
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Simultaneously, impulses are sent from Broca’s area to the primary motor 
area. From here, impulses reach your breathing muscles to regulate the 
proper flow of air past the vocal cords. The coordinating contractions of your 
speech and breathing muscle enable you to translate your thoughts into 
speech. (Tortora, Anagnostakos, 1987: 322). 
 
Emotion Areas: 
Neurological research into emotion has mapped brain areas linked to specific 
emotional responses and affects. Attempts have also been made to define Primary 
and Secondary Emotions and the role of specific brain areas and hierarchies. 
When researching brain areas related to emotion, neurological digital imaging 
technology has tended to focus on imaging specific responses in the Limbic 
system. Areas of the Limbic System include: The amygdala: relevant to 
friendship, love and affection, mood, fear, rage and aggression. The hippocampus: 
related to long-term memory and comparison of past and present experience. The 
hypothalamus: connected to sexuality, combativeness, hunger and thirst, pleasure, 
rage, displeasure and uncontrollable laughter. 
 
 
Figure 40. The Limbic System 
http://mikeclaffey.com/psyc2/notes-cog-motivation-emotion.html [Accessed 25-05-2013] 
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The Limbic System is shown to encircle the brain stem in a wishbone shape and 
thought to connect to ‘primitive’ brain areas. Primary emotions are defined as being 
universal and include six basic and instinctive emotions: happiness, sadness, fear, 
surprise, anger and disgust (Eckman, 1969). These are linked to the amygdala and 
related to primordial areas of the brain stem and spinal cord, which are considered 
to be an early evolutionary development of the nervous system (Damasio 
2006:137). This implicates the limbic system and its function with the impulsive and 
primordial responses required for survival behavior, which in part explains why 
emotions complexity has often been undervalued. 
 
Secondary emotions are thought to be more complex than primary emotions and 
can be acquired and learnt e.g. optimism, love, humiliation, and hope. Damasio 
links secondary emotion with orbitofrontal/ventromedial cortex, which is located just 
behind the eyes (Damasio, 2006:134-139).  Neuroimaging technology reveals this 
connection between the brain and emotion by highlighting areas of brain activity, 
when stimulated by specific sensations from the external world. 
 
However, to begin to establish any kind of relationship between the functioning of 
the brain and emotion requires technological imaging of emotion and brain 
responses over the duration of the emotion. This movement requires continual 
representation, for the stilled MRI images that we see in response to an emotional 
stimulus, simply reveals a particular visceral response of a specific moment of 
time. Emotion, like film and sound continually changes over time and our duration. 
Whereas time has been used as an external measure of things, the journey of our 
emotions and lived experience persists throughout our entire duration. 
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Appendix 6: 
Digital Technology: 
 
Claude Shannon, using the mathematical symbols of 0 and 1 designed electrical 
circuits to store and manipulate the most basic units or ‘bits’ of electronic data.  
This calculation of numbers into units of electronic data is simplified by using the 
binary codes of 0 or 1. These ‘bits’ of digital data relate to being either switched on 
or off by an analogue-to-digital converter (ADC). The ADC samples continuous real 
world analogue signals, using equipment such as a camera or microphone, to 
convert samples of light and sound into digitally discrete numbers at defined signal 
rates. As the ADC is unable to instantaneously convert analogue signal input to a 
digital value, usually a capacitor samples the analogue voltage input by 
electronically switching and disconnecting the capacitor from the signal. To 
determine the amount of electrical volts/values captured and processed throughout 
an analogue signals recording, the converted resolution is a numerical 
representation of discrete values produced over the range of the captured 
analogue signal. 
 
 
Each capacitor when exposed to light, transfers its contents via a controlled circuit 
to a neighbouring capacitor, the final capacitor deposits its charge into an amplifier 
that converts light into a voltage. Photoactive sites enable each capacitor to 
accumulate and store an electric charge proportional to the light intensity at its 
location. Electrical charges of greater or lesser intensity are translated by an 
analogue-to-digital converter (ADC) into pixels of specific brightness and colour 
value.  
 
The digital computer is constructed from a collection of millions of connecting 
switches that turn on and off as they process binary number calculations. Digital 
technology data is then transferred to a digital processor where bit numbers are 
used to reconstitute the data for monitor/projector/speaker display, as coloured 
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pixels or sound samples. Each binary holds the code for recreating pixels of a 
certain colour or sounds of a specific tone, the greater the byte or bit-number the 
more comprehensive the colour and sound palette, which provides a better 
rendition of the originally captured analogue information.  
 
Digital picture quality is defined by its colour depth, formed by breaking black, white 
and colour into small units of value to create the tonal range for each pixel. Digital 
colour images are made up of bits resulting in a pixel recreated from a number 
formula. For example an 8-bit number value, is equal to the colour formation of a 
single pixel formed from a mixture of red, green and blue (RGB) components made 
from a palette of millions of colours (for example R256 x G256 x B256 is equal to 
16 million colours). Finally, to assist our comprehension of the digitised sound or 
image, it needs to be played back to us as an analogue form.  
 
 The shutter speed and aperture combinations of the camera set and affect, the 
quantity of exposure according to the sensitivity of a digital cameras charge couple 
devices (CCD’s). The contents is processed and converted into a sequence of 
voltages that are sampled and digitised. Low light levels require slower shutter 
speeds to enable enough light to fill the photosite container. 2 - Each photosite cell 
creates a separate pixel and when fully charged, photosites create white.  
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Appendix 7: 
The things I have to go under? (A Short Film to be read aloud) 
 
Your nose has something stuck on the end of it. Should I tell you or not? If I tell 
you, do I tell you because that’s the rational thing to do, or do I tell you because 
that’s the emotional thing to do? Whatever, I like you and if I tell you its because I 
like you and if I don’t tell you its because I like you. I’m driving my car, its an 
automatic, its slow on country roads, especially when passing tractors. I wonder if 
you like me…there’s something stuck on the end of your nose 
 
This emotion causes problems, clever, can’t be trusted, impulsive, over 
sentimental, irrational, cool, calm and sophisticated. It knows too much…. frankly 
it’s out of control. How much better or worse can this get?  Often I confuse it with 
sensations, feelings, odd expressions and outlandish behaviour. Red, lorries, 
yellow tractors, red cars, yellow lorries. All of these help but what about your nose, 
the light is fading, I’m driving, accelerating.   
 
Me and this emotion, we risk division. What is its difference, its ideas, its 
knowledge? I refuse its separation, it lives with sensations, feelings, intelligence, 
intuition, brain, body, mind that bus up ahead! Emotion, sparking, fuelling, moving, 
falling, soaring, graduating, fading, changing, light from day to night. In-between 
moments are my favourite, moving light to dark and back again, unclear which 
way, recognising nothing, wondering everything. 
 
Who’s been on this trail before? Science, history, psychology, brain activity, 
behaviour. A viewer, an actor, an emotion, chuffed scientists colour in the 
amygdala, the hippocampus, the hypothalamus ….red, green, blue and every 
visceral hue, Descartes passions, Darwin’s expressions, the colours of rage, 
jealousy, joy. Could philosophy help? Unobservable, immeasurable, everything 
touched, felt, sensed, smelt, tasted, folded and moulded?  
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Artists, lead me down your avenues, pathways to psychology, science, philosophy. 
Gertrude Stein, you are a mentor and William James yours, A painter, philosopher, 
neurologist, psychologist, the father of American psychology, What is Emotion? I 
flick on my lights, it’s a murky old day. 
 
James and Bergson, Bergson and metaphysics, creative evolution, creative 
emotion, cubism. Picasso, portraits, Stein, Duchamp. Painting, sound, text. mobile 
phones.  Deleuze, text, taxonomy, signs, time-images, intuition, movies, painting, 
sound, movement, light, intervals, vibrating, Stein, Bacon, Deleuze, sensation, 
neuroscience, limbic systems, neurons, confusion. 
 
Hypothalamus, combativeness, sexuality, hunger, thirst, pleasure, rage, 
mechanistic Americans, tender buttons and uncontrollable laughter. Amygdala, 
Damasio, affective, activities, fear, rage, friendship, aggression, love, you pass me 
an affection-image. Hippocampus, phenomena, long-term memory, comparisons 
between, past and present. Intervals, memory, perception, affection, sensitive 
nerves but what of emotion?  
 
Journeys, gut feelings, breathing, depth, throat, mouth, tongue, words, rubbed out 
on lips. Surrounded, sound above, below, on-screen, off-screen, ice cream, you’ve 
dropped your cone, layers, sweet papers. Anatomy, darkness, film, fabulation, 
morals, religion, spaces, screens, fought, rethought, hesitated. Larynx, choking 
emotion, liquid, diving up nor down, lodged in throat. Sentences aren’t emotional, 
paragraphs are, rhythm, pacing, moving camera, action shot, speaker systems, 
landscapes. 
 
Kant look! Sheep, full of beauty and grace, geometry and space, arithmetic and 
time, repetition, succession, multiplicity. Duration, complexity, qualitative Big Ben, 
big ben, big ben…. pity, stepping in, fear, sympathy, humility, the car changes 
gear. Fighter planes roar, gaseous trails drift behind, the past, the continuous 
present. I check the rear view mirror and think of you.  
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Perceiver, here is my work, is there room for you? Can you find your creative 
emotions, your time-image? Indictor, orange, on, off, on, off… right foot, 
accelerator snug to the floor. Hands full of ideas, few gears, limited control, electric 
window, up and down, I hate this song, turn it off. This tractor is longer than I 
thought, ahead car lights grow larger, brighter, stronger, I’m on the wrong side of 
the road, didn’t mean to be. I reach out and touch your nose. 
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Video\Filmography [All links below accessed on 24 September 2012] 
 
Marina Abramovic: Balkan Baroque Film by Pierre Coulibeu: 
http://www.ubu.com/film/coulibeuf.html 
 
Dryden Goodwin 
http://www.drydengoodwin.com 
 
Douglas Gordon: Interview: Meet The Artist: Douglas Gordon - Part 1 (1hr.11min) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DXY99WS-Byo&feature=related 
 
Douglas Gordon - Part 2 (47:20) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjYb6EN0v8w&feature=related 
 
Gary Hill 
http://www.garyhill.com 
 
Takahiko Iimura 
http://www.takaiimura.com 
 
Derek Jarman: 
http://channel.tate.org.uk/media/26406493001 
 
2 - Derek Jarman: Wittgenstein: (Feature Film – useful to observe minimal set 
design and film lighting) 
http://www.ubu.com/film/jarman_wittgenstein.html 
 
3 - Derek Jarman: 
http://www.ubu.com/film/jarman.html 
 
Isaac Julien 
http://www.isaacjulien.com/home 
 
2 - Isaac Julien - Interview with Isaac Julien Re: Derek Jarman Documentary 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DysA0u0591Y&feature=related 
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Anthony McCall 
http://www.anthonymccall.com 
 
Tim Macmillan - Time Slice Films 
http://www.timeslicefilms.com 
 
Bjorn Melhus 
http://www.melhus.de 
 
Jonas Mekas 
http://jonasmekas.com 
 
Jonas Mekas: Film on UbuWeb: Scenes from Allen's Last Three Days on Earth as 
a Spirit 
http://www.ubu.com/film/mekas_ginsberg.html 
 
Michelle Naismith: 
http://www.michellenaismith.com/ 
 
Rosalind Nashashibi (Becks Prize Winner 2003) : ICA London Exhibition (DEC 09): 
Discussion with artist Olivia Plender (Dec 2009) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=huRFE1r4zVI 
 
Rosalind Nashashibi: In conversation with Dieter Roelstraete (Dec 2009) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XG8YlJ2UQJ4 
 
Nam June Paik: 
http://www.paikstudios.com/ 
 
2 - Nam June Paik: UBUWEB Interview 
http://www.ubu.com/film/paik_master.html 
 
Pipilotti Rist: Video Art on Ubuweb: Video Works (1986-2003) 
http://www.ubu.com/film/rist_works.html 
 
Skip Blumberg video about: Nam June Paik (1932-2006): 
http://www.ubu.com/film/paik_master.html 
 
Cindy Sherman Film on UbuWeb: 'Doll Clothes (1975)' 
http://www.ubu.com/film/sherman_doll.html 
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James Turrell 
http://www.facebook.com/pages/James-Turrell/25735791242 
 
Bill Viola 
http://www.billviola.com 
 
Chris Welsby 
http://www.sfu.ca/~welsby 
 
Andy Warhol: Empire 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7idi_5IaMrk 
 
Trinh T. Minh-ha: Film on UbuWeb: 'Shoot for the Contents (1991) 
http://www.ubu.com/film/minh_shoot.html 
 
 	  
